

# How Do Little Frogs Fly? Small States in the European Union

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## Summary

Small EU member states need to exploit the special characteristics of their small public administrations in order to secure their interests and have influence within the Union. They must develop an administrative competence based on features like informality, flexibility, and the autonomy of officials operating according to guidelines rather than fixed negotiating instructions. They also need to acknowledge their limitations, and set priorities to a much greater extent than the large states. A strategy based on these features, combined with a positive image and political willingness, can bring negotiating success within the EU's decision-making processes.

## Introduction

Small member states of the European Union today face new and challenging tasks. They have had to cope with the damage from a difficult economic and monetary crisis, either within their own borders or at the EU level. With the resumed security threat from the East, those on the eastern borders of the Union have either strengthened their defences and called for a firmer security stance from the EU as well as NATO – or have reluctantly joined, against their perceived best interests, in EU sanctions against Russia. More broadly, small nations have to deal with an increasingly fast-evolving EU of 28 member states, and with ever-more complex decision-making processes within existing and recently developed institutions and units. How do small countries with limited administrative capacities – not to mention weaker economic and military capabilities than large member states – cope with these challenges? Do small states stand a chance of having a say in today's European Union?

This policy brief enquires into the methods and tools that small states can apply in order to defend their interests and influence decision-making in the EU. It examines the typical structural weaknesses of small states within the EU, and how they try to overcome them. The main focus is on how small states can use special features of their public administrations, foreign services and EU delegations – features associated with their smallness – to compensate for their limitations and gain influence. We look mainly at small states' interactions with and within two EU institutions: the European Commission and the Council of the European Union. Further, we briefly discuss the importance of image and political will in allowing small states to gain recognition and become influential within the Union. In light of the findings, this paper argues that small-state studies – and the field of European Stud-

ies and International Relations in general – should move away from the traditional variables like population, size of territory, economy and military often used in defining states and their influence within regional and international organizations, and instead examine more relevant qualitative factors such as administrative characteristics, image and political willingness.

## The original power balance: Off to a flying formal start

During the negotiations leading up to the creation of the European Communities, the original small member states – the Benelux states of Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands – were highly concerned with their limited economic and military capabilities compared with the three larger members. In the end, the institutional structures took account of their demands for a more balanced decision-making system. The small states were granted a proportionally larger voice within the new institutions compared with (West) Germany, France and Italy. This arrangement, enshrined in the Treaties, mainly took the form of each member state's veto right within the Council of Ministers; equal access to the policy-making structure of the European Commission; and a proportionally higher number of representatives from the small countries in the European Assembly. Also, the new institutions of the Communities were sited mainly in the small countries. More generally, in the most innovative feature of the 1957 Treaties of Rome, power was transferred from the stronger (and sometimes aggressive) states to supranational bodies where the interests of small states could be better taken into account. This unprecedented institutional set-up provided the small countries with the chance to influence policy-making at the European level to an extent never seen before. It gave the small member states a flying start within the Communities.<sup>2</sup>

## The original power balance: 'Realpolitik'

However, it soon became clear that France and Germany would retain the initiative in the process of European construction. Their close cooperation became the vehicle for steps towards further integration. Their role reflected their greater resources compared with the other members, and their political motivation, including how they wanted to be portrayed (their 'image') at home and abroad. The economic and administrative capabilities of the larger members, and later their military contribution to the protection of Western democracies, gave these two states and Italy a much greater say than that of their three

1 The author is grateful for invaluable assistance from Alyson J.K. Bailes, University of Iceland.

2 Baldur Thorhallsson (2004), 'Can small states influence policy in an EU of 25 members?', in Erhard Busek og Waldemar Hummer (eds), *Liechtenstein Politische Schriften*, vol. 39, Verlag der Liechtensteinischen Akademischen Gesellschaft, pp. 330–347.

smaller partners in the Union. The creation of the European Council, though informal in nature at first, gave heads of governments an increased possibility to influence the overall development of the European project, as well as the nitty-gritty details in each and every policy field. When the UK and later Spain joined the others, claiming their own space at the negotiation table of the European Council, they in turn became more pivotal actors than the smaller newcomers Ireland, Denmark, Greece and Portugal.<sup>3</sup> Recently, Poland has become more assertive within the Union and has been more inclined to use the typical bargaining tactics of other large states (see below) than are the other, smaller newcomers in the EU.<sup>4</sup> Normally, the six states mentioned so far are regarded as the EU's 'large' states, and all others as part of the small states group.<sup>5</sup>

**Table 1: Member States of the European Union: Size Index<sup>6</sup>**

States	Population (millions) 2014	GDP (thousands of euros) 2013	Foreign service personnel April 2001	Year of EU entry
<b>Small states</b>				
Malta	0.43	7.5	256	2004
Luxembourg	0.55	45	206	1958
Cyprus	0.86	18	231	2004
Estonia	1.3	19	479	2004
Latvia	2	23	455	2004
Slovenia	2.1	36	451	2004
Lithuania	2.9	35	440	2004
Croatia	4.2	44		2013
Ireland	4.6	175	820	1973
Slovakia	5.4	74	931	2004
Finland	5.5	202	1642	1995
Denmark	5.6	253	1663	1973
Bulgaria	7.2	41		2007
Austria	8.5	323	1397	1995
Sweden	9.6	436	1500	1995
Hungary	9.9	101	1923	2004
Portugal	10.4	171	2038	1986
Czech Republic	10.5	157	2165	2004
Greece	10.9	182	1810	1981
Belgium	11.2	395	2103	1958
Netherlands	16.8	643	3050	1958
Romania	19.9	144		2007
<b>Large states</b>				
Poland	38.5	396	2730	2004
Spain	46.5	1049	2619	1986
Italy	60.8	1619	4688	1958
United Kingdom	64.3	2017	5500	1973
France	65.9	2144	9800	1958
Germany	80.8	2809	6515	1958

## Structural disadvantages of small states in the EU

Small states face political and administrative problems within the EU decision-making processes due to their more limited resources. They have fewer instruments to pursue their interests and are often regarded as reactive in the international community, compared with the proactive approach of large states.<sup>7</sup> The

International Relations literature in general regards them as having built-in structural weaknesses due to their economic and political vulnerability, reflecting their small domestic markets and their lack of defence and administrative capabilities.<sup>8</sup>

Caroline Grön<sup>9</sup> argues that lack of resources is a key constraint even for the relatively richest and best-organized small states after joining the EU. Diana Panke<sup>10</sup> claims that small states face structural disadvantages within the EU based on voting power and bargaining capacity. Firstly, they have few votes in the Council, and negotiations take place in the shadow of voting calculations even if the final decisions are generally taken by consensus. Accordingly, the larger states have a greater say in working groups, in the Committee of Permanent Representatives, in the Political and Security Committee and in the Council itself. Secondly, small states are less able to offer side payments than the large states due to their limited financial and economic capabilities. Thirdly, a small country is seen as a less valuable coalition member than a large country. A winning coalition must have a few big states and several small states – and drawing a large state into a coalition is more valuable than accommodating a small state. Fourthly, small states have smaller public administrations, smaller ministries and delegations. Moreover, they will often lack policy and scientific expertise in many sectors.

The big question is how small states can compensate for their greater vulnerability within the EU. How can a small state move from being reactive and become proactive? How can special features of small communities, related to administrative characteristics, image and political willingness, help out? And basically: how do small states keep their heads above water?

## Prioritization

Small states set priorities for their activities within the EU. They tend to concentrate on policy sectors where direct benefits can be gained. Moreover, they focus on particular issues within these policy areas in order to guarantee their interests.<sup>11</sup> For instance, Luxembourg has put great effort over the years into securing favourable deals for its financial sector; the Baltic states have been giving priority to secure energy supplies from the West, smooth adoption of the euro, and whatever degree of protection they can gain from the EU's defence and security policies. Cyprus is an example of a small state that uses its strength mainly in connection with resistance against favourable EU policies towards Turkey and occupied North Cyprus.

Small states are forced to prioritize because of the small size of their administrations. They cannot take part in all the EU's activities, and must reluctantly admit that have to miss some meetings within the EU institutions due to their limited staff numbers. This is particularly the case with preparatory panels, experts and comitology committees in the Commission.<sup>12</sup> Moreover, officials of small states often attend meetings simply to observe the ongoing debate without any intention of influencing it. To counter this problem, Luxembourg has an arrangement with Belgium – the only such case – whereby it can be represented by the latter in several meetings.<sup>13</sup> Also, Luxembourg has required practical assistance from the Netherlands during its tenures in the EU Council Presidency; for reasons of convenience, the presidencies of Luxembourg and the Netherlands are always paired in sequence with each other.<sup>14</sup>

On the other hand, the narrower range of interests of small states within the EU makes it not only possible but viable for them to prioritize more strictly. The economies of the small member states rely on fewer export products: for instance, two or three agricultural products under the Common Agricultural Policy may account for a much larger share of their final agricultural production than those of the large states.<sup>15</sup> Hence, small states can prioritize to a much greater extent than the large ones, without damaging their interests. They do, however, need a process for identifying the priorities that will yield objectively sensible results, and that can command domestic acceptance and understanding from at least a majority of citizens. Diverging sectoral interests and ideological differences (including pro- and anti-EU views) can arise in small states just as they can in larger ones. If a small state's elite leans too far one way or gets too far ahead of domestic sentiment, it may have to pay for this with political reverses that in turn can threaten the coherence and credibility of its voice in Europe.<sup>16</sup>

## Informality and flexibility – greater autonomy of officials

Within small states, the working procedures for handling EU affairs are characterized by informality and flexibility. The small size of the bureaucracy allows for smooth and efficient decision-making. Officials tend to know each other and a certain trust seem to be inbuilt with a small public administration. Decisions are often taken in informal meetings or over the telephone. On the other hand, officials in the EU delegations of small states claim that they often lack information and clear objectives from their capitals. Normally, they receive guidelines instead of instructions, which may also be oral rather than written. They are formally and informally expected to find their own way of participating in the EU decision-making process. Hence, officials from small states have greater autonomy and are expected to take their own initiatives in order to succeed in EU negotiations. Still, if needed, they can easily contact higher-ranking officials who have the authority to alter major decisions. Moreover, they will receive written instructions from their ministries if the issue at stake is of great importance for the country – as is common practice in the case of larger states.

3 Baldur Thorhallsson (2000), *The Role of Small States in the European Union*, Aldershot: Ashgate.

4 For instance, see the government of Poland (2014) 10, *PL-UE Poland 10 Years in the European Union*, <http://www.ms.gov.pl/resource/ef26c779-74e4-4a0c-aa73-0a9d3c8b695c>; JCR

5 Baldur Thorhallsson (2006), 'The Size of States in the European Union: Theoretical and Conceptual Perspectives', *Journal of European Integration*, 28 (1): 7–31.

6 Population in millions as of 1 January 2014: Eurostat, accessed 25 February 2015 at <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tps00001&plugin=1>; GDP: Gross domestic product at market prices, Eurostat, accessed 25 February 2015 at <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/refreshTableAction.do?tab=table&plugin=1&pcode=tec00001&language=en>; Foreign service personnel – excluding personnel employed locally by missions abroad: Information collected in foreign ministries in every member state in April 2001.

7 Clive Archer and Neill Nugent (2002), 'Introduction: Small States and the European Union', *Current Politics and Economics of Europe*, 11(1): 1–10.

8 Iver B. Neumann and Sieglinde Gstöhl (2004), 'Lilliputians in Gulliver's World', in C. Ingebritsen, I. Neumann, S. Gstöhl & J. Beyer (eds), *Small States in International Relations*, Reykjavik: Centre for Small State Studies, University of Iceland.

9 Caroline Grön (2014), *Small States Seeking Influence in the European Commission: Opportunities and Constraints*, Research Consortium, Small State Briefs, Centre for Small State Studies, Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence, University of Iceland.

10 Diana Panke (2010), *Small States in the European Union: Coping with Structural Disadvantages*, (Farnham: Ashgate).

11 Thorhallsson 2000; Panke 2010.

12 Per Lægred (2000), 'Implications of Europeanization on Central Administration in the Nordic Countries', paper presented at IASIA Annual Conference, Beijing 10–13 July 2000, Working Group III: Public Service Reform.

13 Thorhallsson 2000.

14 Dirk Jan Van den Berg (1994), 'The Netherlands and Luxembourg: Smaller Countries in an Ever-Larger Europe', *Journals: European Institute of Public Administration (EISPASCOPE)* 3, Maastich, pp. 1–4; Thorhallsson 2006. On the current rotation of the EU Council Presidency see: [https://www.lietuva.lt/en/explore\\_lithuania/pirmininkavimas\\_es\\_tarybai\\_1/presidency\\_of\\_the\\_council\\_of\\_the\\_eu](https://www.lietuva.lt/en/explore_lithuania/pirmininkavimas_es_tarybai_1/presidency_of_the_council_of_the_eu);

15 Thorhallsson 2004.

16 Alyson J.K. Bailes (2009), *Does a Small State need a Strategy?* Reykjavik: Centre for Small State Stud-

### The important role of EU delegations

Officials in small states' Permanent Representations to the EU, located in Brussels, play a greater role than do their counterparts in large states. They participate in domestic policy-making in their capitals as well as in Brussels. They are more often responsible in their own right for negotiations in the Council than in the case of the large states, which more often send experts from ministries to negotiate on their behalf. An official from a small state is expected to specialize in a particular issue or policy field – but is also required to have a good overview of EU policies and attend meetings on a range of topics, as discussed below.

### The wider role of officials

Officials in the public administrations of small states dealing with EU affairs tend to have much wider responsibilities than their counterparts in the large states. The same official in a small country may participate in domestic policy-making while also contributing to policy formation in the Commission. He or she may negotiate in Brussels on behalf of his or her state and take the final decision on a given Commission proposal in one of the working groups of the Council. The same official will sometimes advise the minister in the Council and have responsibility, with others, for deciding on criteria and guidelines in the comitology committees run by the Commission. Finally, the same official may advise on or take a direct part in the implementation process of the resultant directive in his or her home capital. This is never the case with the six large member states. Their larger bureaucracies operate with a much clearer division between policy-making, negotiating and the implementation process. Interestingly, in the mid-1990s, the Netherlands – which had not experienced the same smooth flow of officials between these different phases as the other small states – made explicit efforts to adopt this small-state tactic in order to cope with the growing EU workload.<sup>17</sup>

### Negotiation strategies

The European Studies literature has generally held that small states have less influence on security policy than on other policy fields; moreover, that coalition building has been crucial when small states have succeeded in influencing EU policy.<sup>18</sup>

Panke<sup>19</sup> argues that several features can help small member states to punch above their weight within the EU: these features include years of membership (lengthier membership automatically relates to greater knowledge), domestic political stability, priority-setting (as discussed above), the use of a broad range of negotiation strategies, clear negotiating instructions (a clear national position), and active participation in negotiations. Small states have especially good chances of succeeding in negotiations, according to Panke, if they use persuasion-based strategies rather than bargaining-based ones, can demonstrate a decisive level of knowledge, and present their case as entailing benefits for other member states and for the greater European good.

Small states in general have two possible negotiating strategies. One, they can become proactive in EU policy-making only when issues of direct national interest are on the agenda. In such cases they tend to start with an inflexible negotiation strategy, but are also concerned not to become isolated in the bargaining, and thus are often more willing to compromise at an early stage. However, and secondly, they will be reactive and flexible regarding issues of little national interest to them. Here they will devote all their administrative capacity to guaranteeing a favourable outcome in sectors of importance.<sup>20</sup>

The larger states tend to adopt an inflexible negotiating strategy on all occasions. Their veto threat is taken seriously – unlike the veto threat of smaller states. Consequently, the small states tend to emphasize the culture of consensus, and prefer bargaining in the form of 'package deals' where they can give priority to a few issues of importance, setting aside others. By

contrast, the larger states have sufficient administrative capacity to focus on all the EU's policy sectors and have a wider range of interests within it, *inter alia* as regards controlling EU expenditures and securing their own international positions. Networking and coalition building are central to all member states, but small states have a greater need to form alliances with other members and the Commission (as discussed below) due to their lesser capacity and reduced political clout, also as regards veto power.<sup>21</sup>

### Relations with the European Commission

The small states will use the features identified above also when working with and within the Commission. Their relations with the Commission are characterized by their reliance on it, whether working in its own committees or in the Council. This is because small states often lack information in policy areas of limited domestic importance, and are in greater need of Commission know-how and guidance in negotiations in the Council than are the large states. As a result, small states tend to cooperate with the Commission whereas the large states are much more confrontational towards it.<sup>22</sup> At the same time, small states face various constraints when lobbying the Commission due to their limited resources and lack of focus on Commission processes: this has been shown at least in the case of two small states, Denmark and Sweden.<sup>23</sup>

Small states try to influence proposals in the initial stages within the committee system of the Commission.<sup>24</sup> They will call upon the Commission to act as a mediator between them and the large states, and generally prefer to deal with issues at the Commission level rather than having to negotiate with all EU member states in the Council.

The special features of small public administrations, such as informality and flexibility, help the small states to develop 'a routine working process' with the Commission. A few officials, often just one or two, in a small country will be in direct contact with Commission officials regarding any given proposal. On the Commission side, there will often be only one rapporteur dealing with the particular proposal. Hence, a close working relationship can be established between these actors on each side of the table, and can make communication and decision-making much smoother than in the case of the large states. In the process, the Commission can gain special insights into the situation in these small countries. It is particularly relevant for the Commission to develop good relations with the officials of small states, precisely because they tend to be personally involved at all levels of EU affairs. These officials can make an important contribution to the drafting of proposals and can often respond swiftly to new developments in negotiations, making decisions autonomously. Such relations can facilitate mutual understanding between the small state and the Commission, giving the former better chances of getting its views incorporated in the Commission's policy proposals. It is true that a larger state may be a more valuable coalition partner for the Commission – but it is often much cheaper 'to buy' the support of a small state than a big one. That said, the Commission is not ultimately or in any simple sense the defender of small-state interests. Also small states must fight their way through the Commission if they want to convince it that their ideas should be incorporated into its proposals.<sup>25</sup>

Findings by Grön (2014) indicate that civil servants from two small states, Denmark and Sweden, regard technical propositions as the most efficient way to convey their inputs, along with proposals that embody the EU general good and can lead to a compromise. Grön argues that Denmark and Sweden can impact legislation considerably if they lobby the Commission early on in the decision-making process and provide technical input.<sup>26</sup>

In the new College of Commissioners appointed in 2014, small states are in a particularly strong position. The President of the Commission comes from one of the smallest member states (Luxembourg) and six out of its seven Vice-Presidents are also from small states (Finland, Latvia, Slovakia, Estonia, Netherlands and Bulgaria). The sole exception is the High Representative of

17 Thorhallsson 2000.

18 Baldur Thorhallsson and Anders Wivel (2006), 'Small States in the European Union: What do we know and what would we like to know?', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 19 (4): 651–668; D. Arter (2000) 'Small State Influence within the EU: the Case of Finland's Northern Dimension Initiative', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 38(5): 677–697; Ivo Maes and Amy Verdun (2005) 'Small States and the Creation of the EMU: Belgium and the Netherlands, Pace-Setters and Gate-Keepers', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 43(2): 327–348; Anders Wivel (2005), 'The Security Challenge of Small EU Member States: Interests, Identity and the Development of the EU as a Security Actor', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 3(2): 393–412; S.W. Duke (2001) 'Small States and European Security', in E. Reiter & H. Gartner (eds.) *Small States and Alliances* (Heidelberg: Physica-Verlag), pp. 39–50.

19 Panke 2010.

20 Thorhallsson 2000.

21 Ibid.

22 Ibid.

23 Grön 2014.

24 Thorhallsson 2000; Panke 2010.

25 Thorhallsson 2000.

26 Grön 2014.

the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who comes from Italy. The media and even the academic world would be likely to conclude that the large states had taken over the Commission if it had been they who filled most of these posts.

### Image

Small states build their international image on domestic reputation and knowledge in particular policy fields.<sup>27</sup> Christine Ingebritsen<sup>28</sup> argues that small states can become norm-setters in regional and international organizations. For instance, domestic success and deep-rooted knowledge on certain internationally salient issues such as environmental protection, human rights, women's rights, and humanitarian and development assistance have had enormous value for the Nordic states' position within the EU. These states have created a positive, progressive and responsible image of themselves internationally, using it to place issues on the agenda, build coalitions, and get their ideas accepted within the EU. They have thereby become what the literature calls 'norm entrepreneurs'. For instance, the three Nordic states have managed to use their favourable image as environmentally friendly countries to make their voice heard, even to take the lead, within EU environmental policy.<sup>29</sup>

Furthermore, a stable political system and good governance at home can become a soft power tool. This has often held good for the Benelux and Nordic member states within the EU, who regularly rank near the top of the Vision of Humanity organization's Global Peace Index, which measures both internal and external behaviour.<sup>30</sup> For similar reasons, personalities from small states are often entrusted with mediating or investigatory duties that raise both their own and their nation's profile: a practice also reflected in the EU's choice of Special Representatives, other emissaries, and commanders for Common Security and Defence Policy missions.

However, small states need to have a certain critical mass of administrative competence to transform their positive image in a specific policy field into a power resource.<sup>31</sup> A focus on making technical inputs on prioritized proposals can be particularly cost-effective for them. Small states can punch above their weight if they are able to use their knowledge as a power tool in providing helpful information for other members and the Commission, thereby getting especially good chances of influencing the technical side of proposals.<sup>32</sup>

### Political will

States also need to have the political will and ambition to take an active part in EU decision-making. Some states may simply lack ambition in this respect,<sup>33</sup> as has

been seen (for different reasons) in the cases of Greece<sup>34</sup> and Slovenia.<sup>35</sup> Political leaders need to be willing to spend time, effort and money on working within the EU.<sup>36</sup> Moreover, the governing elite must believe that it can have a say in the decision-making processes. If it considers its chances hopeless and/or sees the EU as doomed to be ineffective on a given issue, it may not even try to contribute to or influence decision-making.<sup>37</sup> But there are positive examples: most members of the Danish political elite appear to be confident of guaranteeing Danish interests within the EU; they want to keep Denmark at the heart of the European integration process.<sup>38</sup> Personal leadership skills and ability to take initiatives are of enormous value in such cases when combined with political willingness to influence EU decision-making. This has been clearly demonstrated, as noted, with regard to the impact of the three Nordic EU member states on environmental policy.

### Conclusions

In order to answer the original question 'How do little frogs fly?' we need to consider the capacity and immediate environment of that little amphibian. Importantly, the frog must acknowledge its limitations: it has to accept the fact that it cannot fly! On the other hand, with sufficient practice, it may be able to leap high and far – which, in this metaphor, corresponds to the importance of administrative competence of small states within the EU. Indeed, some clever frogs can leap high enough to get themselves out of a well – but they still need a good level of general 'dampness' in the environment in order to survive, reflecting the small states' reliance on a favourable political culture and decision-making system within the EU.

The original set-up of the European Communities gave the small states a flying start. In the new millennium and in response inter alia to successive enlargements, the large states have made numerous attempts to alter the power balance between themselves and the group of smaller members. However, the small states have managed to resist radical changes that would alter the EU decision-making system in favour of the large ones, and can still exercise considerable influence within their chosen policy fields. In particular, and despite repeated prophecies, the enlarged EU has not developed a regular 'hard core' or limited 'directoire' of its largest members.

This policy brief has argued that, by avoiding and continuing to avoid such developments, turning the special characteristics of small public administration into advantages can prove to be a winning (and cost-effective) tactic for the smaller players. However, small states also need to develop administrative competence based on these features, and combine this with a positive image and political willingness, in order to have a say within the EU. Any attempt to predict or explain their relative success must pay attention to such features just as much as, if not more than, those conventional parameters of state size: power and wealth.

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27 Thorhallsson 2006.

28 Christine Ingebritsen (2004), 'Norm Entrepreneurs: Scandinavia's Role in World Politics', in C. Ingebritsen, I. Neumann, S. Gstöhl & J. Beyer (eds), *Small States in International Relations*, Reykjavik: Centre for Small State Studies, University of Iceland.

29 Gunnhildur Lily Magnúsdóttir, *Small States' Power Resources in EU Negotiations: Nordic Eco-entrepreneurship within the Environmental Policy of the EU*, Lambert Academic Publishing, 2010.

30 See <http://www.visionofhumanity.org/#/page/contact>.

31 Baldur Thorhallsson (2012a), 'The Icelandic economic collapse: How to overcome constraints associated with smallness?', *European Political Science*, Symposium, European Consortium for Political Research, 26 October 2012, pp. 1–13; Baldur Thorhallsson (2012b), 'Small States in the UN Security Council: Means of Influence?', *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, 7(2): 135–160.

32 Grön 2014.

33 Thorhallsson 2006.

34 Thorhallsson 2000.

35 Cirila Toplak, 'Small States in Europe: Slovenia and its position within the European Union', lecture at the Centre for Small State Studies, University of Iceland, 27 October 2014.

36 Grön 2014.

37 Thorhallsson 2006.

38 Friis Arne Petersen, 'The International Situation and Danish Foreign Policy 1997', in B. Heurling & H. Mouritzen (eds), *Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook*, 1998 (Copenhagen: Danish Institute of International Affairs), pp. 9–25.

39 Thorhallsson and Wivel, 2006.

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