

# The Role of Small States in the European Union

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# 5 The Administrative Working Procedures of Member States

## Introduction

This chapter examines the administrative working procedures of the smaller states in the decision-making process of the EU in the areas of the CAP and the Regional Policy and it establishes the impact which the small size of the administrations of the smaller states has on their behaviour. This chapter will test our third hypothesis that:

the administrative working of the smaller states in the decision-making process of the CAP and the Regional Policy is characterized by greater informality and greater flexibility. Also, national officials of smaller states dealing with issues which are not regarded as being of vital importance, have greater room of manoeuvre in negotiations compared to the officials of larger states. Because of this the administrations of smaller states are able to deal with EU demands as efficiently as the administrations of the larger states.

In order to establish a state's behaviour in the decision-making process of the EU it is necessary to analyse what impact its administrative characteristics may have on its relations with EU institutions. This is particularly important for two reasons. Firstly, state administrations arrange domestic EU policy-making. Secondly, they conduct state business in the EU. The question which arises is whether the small size of an administration affect the state's behaviour in the decision-making process of the EU, and if so what distinguishes it from the behaviour of larger states. This is very important because we need to examine the administrative behaviour of smaller states in the EU decision-making process before moving on to analyse their relations with the European Commission and their approach towards negotiations in the Council of Ministers. This is because if the administrative working procedures of the smaller states in the EU differ from that of larger states, we can expect their behaviour in the EU decision-making process to differ from that of larger states.

Katzenstein does not look at in detail how the smallness of the administrations of smaller states may affect their interactions internationally. He examines the relationship between administrations, the political elite and interest groups in smaller states but he does not directly tackle the advantages or disadvantages of a small administration. He discusses in general terms the organization in smaller states: organization meaning both the state bureaucracy and private institutions. He argues that organizations in smaller states, private or public, have a broader function as they deal with a greater variety of issues than organizations in larger states. Organizations in smaller states are less specialized: they work more closely than those of larger states with other national organizations in order to solve problems. Institutions in small states are selective in problem definition, as our evidence suggested in the previous chapter, and they make interorganizational relations very personal. Katzenstein argues that there is a fluidity of relationships in smaller states, together with oligarchic tendencies within them as decisions are made by few decision-makers. Centralization of domestic structures in smaller states is a result of their small size and dependence on world markets. This in turn impacts on the policy-process in the smaller states which differs from that of larger states.<sup>184</sup>

We have to establish whether these characteristics do exist within the administrations of the smaller EU states, and if so, to what extent they impact upon the behaviour of the smaller states in the EU. We need also to go further than Katzenstein and look more directly and in more detail at the characteristics of the administration of smaller states. Katzenstein does briefly mention the relationship of the administration of the smaller states with domestic economic policy-making. He argues that smaller states are statist, for two reasons. Firstly, they accord their administration an important place in policy-making. Secondly, they are highly selective in pre-empting the costs of change through intervention, and they undertake protection in the name of structural transformation.<sup>185</sup> On the other hand, Katzenstein argues that smaller states are also antistatist because they neutralize their administrations by a lack of autonomy and their own political interests.<sup>186</sup> However, he does not explain clearly how he comes to these findings and what implications this has for the international behaviour of smaller states. We need, therefore, to examine the characteristics of smaller administrations and see how they compare with those of larger states if we want to establish their behaviour in the decision-making process of the EU.

Our primary aim in this chapter is to analyse administrative working-procedures of member states in the areas of the CAP and the Regional Policy. This chapter will, however, only deal with EU domestic policy-making with respect to the affect the size of their administrations may have on their interactions in negotiations in EU institutions. We are more concerned with the impact a small administration may have on a state's behaviour in the EU than how a small state conducts its EU policy.

This chapter is divided into six sections. We will start by looking at the administrative tasks of participating in the EU decision-making process and spell out the complexity which administrations face in dealing with the increasing demands of the EU. The first section will also analyse the EU policy co-ordination of member states and the important role which the Permanent Representations play in this co-ordination. The second section analyses how the administrative working procedures of member states work out in practice regarding EU matters and their administrative characteristics. It focus particularly on the working procedures of the Permanent Representations making a comparison between larger and smaller states. Although the Permanent Representations oversee, coordinate and deal with the day-to-day management of the participation of states in the decision-making process of the EU, the national administrations of member states also have to be taken into account, particularly in the ministries, as they take part in the day-to-day management of EU business. The third section investigates how administrations cope with the EU demands. The fourth section analyses Greece's administrative problems. This is because the administration of Greece is a special case in the EU and as such needs to be examined. The fifth section includes a special analysis of the administrative working procedure of Spain: a week large administration. The sixth section is a summary of the chapter and will provide an analysis of the response of states to EU demands. In the conclusion we will look back at the approach of Katzenstein, particularly his explanation of smaller states international behaviour. We will argue that his approach misses an important variable, the size and characteristics of administrations, in explaining their international behaviour.

### The EU Policy Co-ordination of Member States and their Administrative Tasks of Participating in the EU

The co-ordination of EU policies is a huge task for the administrations of member states. The EU national policy-making co-ordination takes place at different levels; from local and/or regional administrations and national administrations, at the domestic level, to the co-ordination in Brussels of Permanent Representations of member states. The administrations of member states work at three levels, according to the institutions, in the EU decision-making process. Firstly, the main aim of the administrations in the EU is to influence decisions in the Council. They try to influence decisions in its three decision-making levels: working group meetings; COREPER meetings and the Special Committee of Agriculture (SCA) meetings; and the Council of Ministers meetings.<sup>187</sup> Secondly, national administrations are in close contact with the Commission before it draws up proposals and while it is redrawing the proposals while taking part in negotiations in the Council of Ministers.<sup>188</sup> Thirdly, national administrations also try to influence the European Council.<sup>189</sup>

The Single European Act (SEA), and the increased use of qualified majority voting in the Council of Ministers has speeded up the decision-making process. The Commission now puts forward more proposals, and more decisions are made in the Council. This gives national officials less time to work on each proposal and prepare for negotiations and also decisions have to be made quicker at the national level as negotiations in the Council are taking less time. The Maastricht Treaty has added to the treaty changes and increased further the number of decision processes and rules. National officials have had to adapt to all these changes and to understand the complexity of the negotiation environment.

National administrations face several difficulties in managing the EU business negotiations.<sup>190</sup> For instance, there is a lack of control over large areas of agenda setting which makes it difficult for administrations to oversee developments in all of the EU policy-areas and sectors. It is difficult to manage policy initiatives and innovations because of a lack of a clearly defined negotiated order which is structured around well-established and reasonably stable policy networks.<sup>191</sup> Also, the structural ambivalence of decision-making in the EU complicates participation. The EU is a combination of a federation, a supranational body, intergovernmental bargaining and an international regime. Decisions are taken by supranational institutions and in intergovernmental bargaining.<sup>192</sup> Furthermore, administrations may be required to co-ordinate in a different

way at national level and at EU level. The types of skills, styles and resources needed may differ. Participation in the EU decision-making process may require different types of co-ordination 'which is not only different from that prevalent at national level but may even be in conflict with it'.<sup>193</sup>

The EU policy co-ordination of member states is of key importance for their participation in negotiations in the Council.<sup>194</sup> Success in the decision-making process, in fact, 'depends on a country's capacity to co-ordinate across the extended policy chain'.<sup>195</sup> Co-ordination also requires a thorough knowledge of issues on the agenda and national policy-makers are only able to draw up adequate instructions with expert knowledge.<sup>196</sup>

The nature of the domestic EU co-ordination of member states varies widely. Some institutional emulation and convergence has taken place: for instance, the creation of the ministries of European Affairs and interdepartmental committees with similar titles, but 'variety is still the dominant feature of national co-operation'.<sup>197</sup> Wright argues that this variety is determined by the interplay of four major factors: Firstly, it is determined by formal organisations and procedures. All national administrations, large or small, have a formal procedure. These formal procedures differ, however, between administrations on account of their historical development and different principles. Administrations adapt their procedures to different environments in order to deliver what is expected of them. Secondly, the variety is characterized by internal informal networks. Thirdly, it is determined by internal politico-administrative style and culture. Administration organisations and procedures are characterized by defined values, social attitudes and traditions.<sup>198</sup> Fourthly, the variety is determined by the pattern of ambitions, resources and constraints.<sup>199</sup>

There are, however, some similarities in the domestic instruments of EU policy co-ordination of member states. Wright gives three major similarities in his study on the domestic co-ordination of member states. Firstly, heads of government aided by the Foreign Minister and Finance Minister deal with major political and constitutional EU issues. Secondly, the Foreign Ministries and Finance Ministries in member states have taken over their co-ordination link between the domestic capital and EU institutions in Brussels. Thirdly, in all the member states, most ministries have adjusted their internal organizations to the requirements of EU policy-making.<sup>200</sup>

Formal EU policy co-ordination in Brussels is similar for all member states. They are represented by a Permanent Representation which is

headed by an Ambassador. Permanent Representations are serviced by national officials and diplomats from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs. Permanent Representations of all the member states were initially mainly diplomats and officials from Finance Ministries and Agricultural Ministries, but as the scope of the EU has expanded, the number of other national officials specializing in particular sectors has increased.<sup>201</sup> The task of the Permanent Representation can be split broadly into six features: Firstly, the Permanent Representation is responsible for informing the national government of possible, or impending EU, legislation. This requires sensitive antennae and an effective information gathering and transmission service. Permanent Representatives, for instance, send ministries and other co-ordination bodies the proposals from the European Commission and inform them about all future reforms and proposals. Secondly, the role of the Permanent Representation is to defend the national position in EU institutions. It has to present it in an acceptable form and at the appropriate moment. Thirdly, the Permanent Representation role is to negotiate the national position. The Permanent Representation works essentially through COREPER in order to prepare Council meetings. Permanent Representatives' work is particularly concentrated around the working groups of the Council. Their task is to report back to their national capitals the details of relevant proposals. In addition, they frequently have to translate government instructions into bargainable positions within the working groups. Fourthly, The Permanent Representation task is also, more generally, to inform all the relevant EU institutions in Brussels and member states representatives of its government's position. This is particularly important in relations with the Commission and other member states as a state tries to secure a positive decision-making outcome. Fifthly, the Permanent Representations also reports back to their national administrations and/or organizations concerning EU decisions and on the repercussions of these decisions for their national law.<sup>202</sup> Finally, the role of the Permanent Representatives is to participate in the EU domestic policy-making process. They play a crucial role in the preparation and co-ordination of national positions.<sup>203</sup>

These Permanent Representatives' duties have to be successfully carried out in order to satisfy domestic interests at home. They are at the centre of communication between national administrations and EU institutions. As stated in the handbook of the Belgium Direction of European Affairs (P.11) which belongs to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 'the Permanent Representation is for the Belgian Administrations the only statutory channel for all communication with the EC institutions'.<sup>204</sup> This

requires a huge effectiveness on the part of the Permanent Representatives and good co-ordination between Permanent Representatives and officials in member state capitals.

Hoscheit argues that smaller states must mobilize comparatively more administrative resources to overcome EU complexity. They have developed an adequate strategy of bureaucratic design to compensate for their relative lack of material input. Their strategy is based upon: the precise ordering of priorities, administrative adaptations, and a pragmatic and informal management of procedures.<sup>205</sup> The smaller member states are caught between the rising demands of the EU and their limited resources. They have to find a balance between these two factors which leads to differentiated strategies of institutional adjustment, 'this is a major challenge, one that has a direct bearing on the overall performance of a country in the context of European policymaking'.<sup>206</sup>

### Working Procedures of Member States' Administrations in the EU: Administrative Characteristics of Smaller States

#### *The Support given by Ministries and Co-ordination Bodies to the Permanent Representatives and the Pivotal Role played by Permanent Representatives from the Smaller States*

The Permanent Representations of larger states have more support from their ministries in their capitals than those of smaller states. Larger state Permanent Representations get direct instruction and information from their national administrations while Permanent Representatives from smaller states often have to find their own way of participating in negotiations in the Council of Ministers.<sup>207</sup> Negotiators from smaller states are rather satisfied with the EU coordination in their capitals<sup>208</sup> but they sometimes find they lack information and clarity. For instance, the Belgian Permanent Representatives and other members of the Belgian delegation generally find that they are not well prepared for negotiations in the Council. They claim that they do not have the political backing and that negotiators from other states perform much better in negotiations.<sup>209</sup> The Permanent Representatives of France and other negotiators, for instance, get full backup from Paris. Their guidelines are clear and they know exactly what is expected of them. In the early 1960s, the Ambassador of the French Permanent Representation made an particular attempt to let the administration in Paris deal with the technicalities of the dossiers while the

delegation tried to get a clear political overview of EU matters instead. This rhythm of work and the relationship with Paris has continued.<sup>210</sup> Larger states often send someone from their capital to management committees meetings while smaller states use their Permanent Representatives to cover management committees. As a British Permanent Representative pointed out when asked about the difference between smaller and larger states' Permanent Representatives in the field of agriculture: 'one difference is that we have considerable backup from the Ministry of Agriculture in London. They send people to attend all the management committees while Permanent Representations from the smaller countries will cover management committees. We have experts in London who will come from London as often as the management committee meets'.<sup>211</sup>

On the other hand, this gives Permanent Representatives from smaller states a pivotal role in domestic EU policy process. They cover more subjects within the EU and their knowledge is essential for EU policymakers in ministries. They are more likely to participate directly in the domestic EU policy-making process, formally or informally.<sup>212</sup> Our evidence suggests that officials in the small state Permanent Representations tend to be generalists rather than specialists. For instance, the Belgian Permanent Representatives who come from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, develop and maintain contacts with officials from many ministries. They deal with varied policy domains and they have more contacts with officials in ministries than other Permanent Representatives who come from other ministries. They tend to limit their contacts with their own ministries.<sup>213</sup> Most Permanent Representatives do not have time to specialize in particular policy fields as they have to deal with greater variety of subjects than their counterparts from larger states, as stated above, so in order to fulfil their obligations they have to be in direct contact with the officials from many ministries. They are in great need of support from their national administration, in order to be able to take a full part in negotiations in the Council, but they get considerable backup only in areas which are regarded to be of importance. The pivotal role of small state Permanent Representatives can directly be explained by the small size of their bureaucracy and the limited number of officials working on EU matters in their capitals.<sup>214</sup>

Important, as well, is that the Permanent Representatives from smaller states are not always required to contact their ministries in order to take a policy stand in negotiations in the Council. They do, of course, contact them frequently during important negotiations but on issues which are not

related to their country they do not have any contact at all in many instances, such as decisions regarding agricultural products which they do not produce. Regional Objectives which they do not belong to, or loans to East-European countries. In contrast, large state Permanent Representatives always have to refer back to their capitals on every single issue with which they deal.<sup>215</sup>

The preparation of dossiers and administrative cooperation are the tasks of the national bureaucracies. Furthermore, some small state negotiators are based in the ministries in their capitals, particularly those who deal with issues which are regarded as being of importance. The Irish government, for instance, often sends national officials from the Ministry of Agriculture to Council negotiations in the Council. The Netherlands also sends officials from important sectorial ministries to working group meetings. However, the status of Permanent Representatives and their inside knowledge ensures that their views are taken into consideration when strategies for issues of high politics are determined.<sup>216</sup>

*The Autonomy of National Civil Servants who are in Contact with Permanent Representatives*

The size of the national bureaucracy determines the autonomy of civil servants who the Permanent Representatives contact in negotiations. The officials that Permanent Representatives of smaller states can contact in their capitals differ from those of the larger states as they can easily reach high-ranking officials. They are more often in direct contact with the civil servants who have the authority to alter the negotiation position of the state in question.<sup>217</sup> This simplifies their domestic EU decision-making process and makes it more efficient. It also gives them the opportunity to respond more quickly to new developments in the Council.<sup>218</sup>

The Danish Permanent Representatives are, for instance, in direct contact with members of the EU Committee which have the authority to form the Danish policy-position. There is also a direct link between the Permanent Representative and members of EU Special Committees. They are at the lowest level of EU co-ordination and decision-making procedures. Thirty such committees existed in 1996 and their task was to co-ordinate the EU policy position of those ministries involved in a particular policy area, such as agriculture, or, on a single issue. Even though these EU Special Committees are the lowest level of EU co-ordination they have a high degree of autonomy. Each EU Special Committee is surrounded by an interdependent network which consists of

its core members, ministers and members of the EU Committee. The EU Committee is the next level of coordination committee and it is composed of senior officials, and officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. These actors can change decisions made by core members of the EU Special Committee. This, however, happens rarely. The main players in the network are the chair, the officials and the minister in charge of the chair's ministry.<sup>219</sup> Permanent Representatives are in daily contact with members of the EU Special Committees' core networks who have the authority to alter Danish policy-positions. On the other hand, if the issue concerned is dealt with by the EU Committee they will get their instructions from its members. They are able to contact them directly which is of practical importance as the policy-makers will have first hand information of the negotiation situation in the Council. They will form their policy-position from the information which they receive from the Permanent Representatives.<sup>220</sup>

The Irish Permanent Representatives have also direct contact with top officials who have the authority to alter the state's policy-position. It is quite common within the Irish administration that 'upper echelons of the civil servants'<sup>221</sup> form a task force to deal with critical negotiations. Irish negotiators have direct access to these civil servants which make the domestic EU decision-making process more efficient and at the same time informal and more flexible.<sup>222</sup> Also, all senior Irish officials in the Ministry of Agriculture are involved in preparations for the weekly meetings of the Special Committee of Agriculture in Brussels and they are in direct contact with Irish negotiators in the Council.<sup>223</sup>

In the case of The Netherlands, Permanent Representatives will contact sectional ministries directly rather than the foreign ministry. EU policy formation takes place in the Dutch sectional ministries and the foreign ministry does not play an active role in the deliberations. The political authority lies in the sectional ministries who can determine the extent to which other ministries should be involved in the deliberations. In addition, they decide whether Permanent Representatives or officials from the ministry in question will attend the working group meetings.<sup>224</sup> There are direct channels between each of the sectional ministries and the Permanent Representation. These channels of formal, or more often, informal nature, ensure that negotiators always get first hand information and guidelines from the policy-makers themselves.

This direct access to the top where decisions are taken makes the EU decision-making process in the smaller states much smoother and quicker. Negotiators from smaller states in Brussels 'do not necessarily have to go



to the head of the foreign affairs ministry and the finance ministry and other ministries which larger states' Permanent Representatives have to do'.<sup>225</sup> This is because middle-ranking officials in the ministries of smaller states can often decide on their own how to proceed as can the Permanent Representatives themselves in Brussels. The reason for this is that ministers in the smaller states often grant their senior civil servants considerable autonomy in handling EU issues. Ministers in Belgium, for instance, give top civil servants considerable manoeuvre with regard to EU issues. These top officials have the authority to negotiate between themselves on particular issues and can decide the policy stand at each stage in the negotiation process. The ministers limit their involvement in EU issues to highly politicized matters. 'In all the other cases, ministers rubber-stamp the compromises that have been reached among civil servants without giving much political input'.<sup>226</sup> On the other hand, when negotiations in the EU are regarded as being of vital importance, Permanent Representatives and other negotiators from smaller states can contact their ministers directly.<sup>227</sup>

A survey amongst civil servants, from two larger states, Britain and Italy, and five smaller states, The Netherlands, Belgium, Ireland, Denmark and Portugal, who negotiate on behalf of their states in Brussels, came up with interesting findings. The negotiators of Italy and Britain argued that, in their countries, politicians predominantly took the initiative regarding new EU legislation which is then proposed at EU level. The negotiators of all the five smaller states, however, argued that the initiative to launch proposals in the EU is predominantly taken by civil servants.<sup>228</sup> This shows the important role which civil servants in smaller states are granted in dealing with EU matters and how they have considerably more autonomy than civil servants of larger states.

The Permanent Representatives of the larger states do not have direct access to top officials in their ministries. They have to follow the hierarchical structure of the administration. They are required to contact middle-ranking officials who can 'often dictate what the officials in Brussels should say'.<sup>229</sup> These middle-ranking officials do not have the authority to change the policy-position of the state. Permanent Representatives are stuck with the same policy position, time after time, not having any room to even slightly alter the policy in order to secure a positive deal. This can make negotiations more difficult as the middle-ranking officials in the ministries either deny or are unable to back down from the original negotiation position.<sup>230</sup> As a Commission official stated 'in the larger states officials often take a hard line but when the minister

shows up in the Council they accept the deal'.<sup>231</sup> Permanent Representatives of the larger states and other national officials negotiating in Brussels do not get direct instruction from ministers as can happen in the smaller states.

Ambassadors of the Permanent Representations of the smaller states in Brussels also contact home on a day to day basis and they are usually in direct contact with ministers. Ambassadors of smaller states are most often career diplomats and the states most senior ambassadors. They are well integrated within the hierarchy of the small administration in the capital. Ambassadors of larger states are also, usually, high ranking officials from the foreign office but they have greater difficulties in overseeing the whole national administration. They are in daily contact with ministries back home and other co-ordination bodies but they will consult ministers only on very important issues.<sup>232</sup>

*The Forms of Contact between the Permanent Representatives, and between the Permanent Representatives and the Civil Servants in the Capitals: Their Informality and Flexibility.*

These direct channels of consultation and information, discussed above, between smaller states Permanent Representatives in Brussels and their national officials in ministries are more often on an informal basis than in the larger state administrations. Officials in smaller states have adopted a flexible strategy and informal working procedures in order to cope with the increasing demands of the EU.<sup>233</sup> The small size of their administrations has automatically altered the way they function, but they have also had to use informal ways of communication and had to increase their administrative flexibility in order to deal with all the EU demands. They do not have enough staff or time to look at all research in detail, to constantly consult different departments and units about particular issues and have to avoid overloading their administrations with new questions and analyses in the middle of negotiation. They use telephone conversations, internet contacts and informal meetings to take decisions.<sup>234</sup>

Furthermore, individual officials and administrative units use their basic knowledge of what scope they have for action. Officials in the smaller states usually know each other, particularly the top officials who have been in their positions for a long time and they know what manoeuvre they have for action and what is expected of them. High ranking as well as lower level officials are often granted unofficial autonomy to deal with issues regarding the EU as trust builds up within the administrations. This trust is not only built on the small size of the administration as the officials



get to know each other very well but also upon a network of officials with a similar background, education and views. A close network between members of the elite in smaller states makes this possible and senior politicians and interest group leaders have often known each other since nursery school.<sup>235</sup>

There is, for instance, a strong contact between the Belgian Permanent Representatives and officials in the cabinets and ministries. These contacts are characterized by informality. Even though ministries do not have any of their officials working within the Permanent Representation there are strong direct contacts between officials in the Permanent Representations and ministries concerned. 'The need of such contacts is fulfilled by the establishment of informal coordination networks'.<sup>236</sup> The Permanent Representation has established informal networks in order to handle issues, particularly those which have to be decided on in a short period of time. Formal meetings are kept to a minimum and decisions are taken in informal meetings and over the telephone.<sup>237</sup> There are also informal co-ordination procedures in cases of repeated decision-making in, for instance, the policy areas of agriculture and the environment.<sup>238</sup> These informal co-ordination procedures, or networks avoid an overloading of the Permanent Representation and other co-ordination bodies and allow for a very quick co-ordination whenever necessary.

Smaller state administrations have developed their own informal specialized working procedures. This informal working procedure consists of cooperation between the main EU policy co-ordination body, most often the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, other ministries which the case concerns, sometimes the sub-national governments and/or local authorities and the Permanent Representation of the member state in question. In Belgium, for instance, informal co-ordination takes place between the cabinet of the federal ministry concerned, cabinets of the ministries of the regions, and the Permanent Representatives who lead the Belgian delegation in the Council. Sub-national administrations can also be involved, if necessary. The official co-ordination bodies, the Direction for European Affairs (P.11) in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Interministerial Economic Committee (CEI) can sometimes be involved in this informal working procedure.<sup>239</sup>

The role of the Permanent Representations is particularly important in the smaller states. A Belgian study indicates that the role of the Belgian Permanent Representations in the Belgian EU coordination system is very important, in fact much more important than its official role indicates. 'In reality, the role of the Belgian PR (Permanent Representation) is much

more important. It is not just one actor among the others, but functions as an important informal coordinator besides P.11'.<sup>240</sup> The official role of the Permanent Representation is to participate like any other in working groups, in COREPER I and II and in the SCA. It participates in the Direction for European Affairs (P.11 Coordination), the main co-ordination body within the Belgian administration and oversees the communications between Belgian institutions, authorities and EU institutions.

The behaviour of Permanent Representation is built on informal contacts and informal meetings with the rest of the Belgian administrations in order to get the quickest and most effective solution. EU issues are responded to on a case by case basis. In other words, the Permanent Representation responds in the way it thinks is going to secure the most beneficial deal for Belgium. The Permanent Representation even in some cases oversees the policy-formation. As the study indicates: 'Many of Belgium's positions in the working groups and COREPER are determined at a meeting organized by the Belgian PR'.<sup>241</sup> The key role of the Permanent Representatives in the informal Belgian network can be explained by their important role in the Belgian delegations in the working groups, COREPER and SCA. An official from the Permanent Representation will lead the delegation and the Permanent Representatives will have a good source of information both from the Commission and other member states. Their expertise and knowledge of how to handle unpredictable situations in negotiations in the EU decision-making process gives them a head start. Permanent Representations of the smaller states have a very good grounding for becoming important members in EU policy co-ordination at national level. As the Belgian study concluded: 'Coordination will take place in the PR meetings anyway'.<sup>242</sup>

The Belgian Permanent Representation acts as a gate-keeper between the formal co-ordination system of P.11 and the semi-formal co-ordination system on specialized issues. It ensures that there will be co-ordination and that this co-ordination will lead to a particular policy-position. The Permanent Representation provides this co-ordination either through the formal channels or by established informal channels of communication. This is especially the case when no formal or semi-formal domestic EU decision-making co-ordination exists because of the lack of frequent decision-making in the EU. It exists also when Belgian formal co-ordination does not manage to form a clear position on particular issues due to the complexity of the Belgian EU policy co-ordination resulting from the new federal structure. 'In such cases, the gap that exists because of the absence of a semi-formal system is filled by the informal networks that are

built by and through the Belgian PR.<sup>243</sup> The weaknesses of the formal EU coordination system in Belgium has been overcome by 'a system of semi-formal and informal coordination'.<sup>244</sup>

The openness and informality of the Danish administration is a typical example of an administration of a small state. The Danish administration is pragmatic and not rigidly bound by law. There are, for instance, no general rules on the sending of proposals for comments;<sup>245</sup> as a result unwritten rules have taken over written rules in the field of administrative law.<sup>246</sup> The Danish EU co-ordination process is strongly centralized but is at the same time flexible and many issues are solved informally.<sup>247</sup> Most issues are decided at the lowest level in the EU Special Committees. However, the domestic EU policy-process does not start with meetings in the Special Committees: in fact, the policy-process often ends there. Substantial coordination takes place outside the formal decision-making process. The most important part of the coordination happens at cave meetings, which are completely secret meetings taking place between the Special Committee meetings. Cave meetings are attended by the main actors involved in the policy-process, and these meetings do not have any formal connection to Special Committee meetings. Cave meetings have gained in importance as more members take part in the formal decision-making procedure in Special Committees. The main negotiation process takes place in these cave meetings and no actor can just appear at the Special Committee meetings and start to negotiate. The Special Committee meetings are where single sentences are rephrased as the main agents have already formed the Danish policy-position beforehand.<sup>248</sup>

The Irish administration facilitates a flexible response to Commission initiatives due to its small size.<sup>249</sup> Ministry departments have considerable autonomy in making policy stands and responses to the EU. This is particularly the case for sectional policy issues and low key issues. The way the administration manages the EU policy-process is to a limited extent institutionalized. Interdepartmental committees are few, and those which exist do not meet often. Contacts and consultations can be said to be neither rigid nor bureaucratic. 'The emphasis is on telephone contact and written observations rather than formal interdepartmental committees'.<sup>250</sup> Laffan argues that elaborate procedures and 'bureaucratic *lourdeur*' are met with hostility by the Irish civil servants. This can be explained by three factors: firstly, the small size of the bureaucracy, as we have already stated. Secondly, the number of issues that are given high priority, as we have already shown in the previous chapter. Thirdly, the administrative culture, as has been pointed out earlier, as a factor for explaining

administration interaction. 'Personalism is a dominant cultural value in Ireland arising from late urbanization and the small size of the population'.<sup>251</sup> Personalism is found in all small communities. It is reflected in smaller administrations as contacts between officials are extensive and easy to establish. Laffan continues: 'Irish civil servants know their counterparts in other departments, state agencies and representatives of the main interest organizations. The small nucleus of senior civil servants dealing with Brussels on a continuous basis meet frequently, either formally or informally, which reduces the need for formalized committees'.<sup>252</sup>

In the Netherlands, the network of national officials who have considerable autonomy in EU policy-formulation is limited to a small core number of senior civil servants. They often participate in weekly meetings together with Permanent Representatives where the main EU policy line is drawn up for the week to come. They meet separately and the number of informal contacts between them is uncountable. Furthermore, each of these officials often has a great deal of manoeuvre in their ministry and can act independently in co-operation with Permanent Representatives with the approval of the minister.<sup>253</sup> Dutch senior civil servants in sectional ministries not only have considerable manoeuvre to formulate their government's EU policy-position, but also some flexibility in deciding the negotiation tactics used in the Council. This is because of 'the Dutch respect for the principle of departmental autonomy'.<sup>254</sup> Instructions for COREPER meetings are first formulated in sectional ministries which are responsible for the issue stage. They are formulated by officials who have already taken part in trying to settle the matter in the Council working groups. The final draft is then written by the Directorate for European Integration at the Foreign Ministry but neither this body nor other ministries tends to intervene if they are not directly linked to the issue. Nor do they intervene if an agreement has been reached in the Council working groups. Other ministries do not, in fact, have the opportunity to intervene in the subjects of other ministries until COREPER instruction meetings, which officials from all ministries attend, and where coordination of the national position takes place.<sup>255</sup>

This important role of the Permanent Representations of the smaller states and their informal co-ordination system can be explained by the fact that administrations have constantly had to adapt to the increasing agenda of the EU. This has been a huge task for the smaller administrations. They have had to increase their capacity without any substantial increase in their resources: staff, expertise and money. Because of this they have been less

prepared to deal with the increasing demands than larger administrations. This is reflected in their flexible working procedure and informal methods. It is also reflected in the ad hoc adaptations of their different ministries to the changing EU.

Permanent Representations are the first to notice the burden of the increased EU agenda due to their role as negotiators in the Council and their close relationship with the Commission. They have to respond to these changes in an efficient manner if they are not to be accused of inefficiency in dealing with the EU. The Permanent Representation cannot, however, establish their own formal EU co-ordination mechanism as it is the role of governments, head of ministries or administrations back in the capitals. As a result the only way for the Permanent Representatives of the smaller states to cope with the increasing scope of EU policies and its new policy-areas is to establish informal channels of communication. Their informal working procedures make it possible for them to perform their role as is expected of them. This gives them greater autonomy in domestic EU policy-coordination. Also, more importantly, this gives them greater manoeuvre in dealing with EU institutions than large state Permanent Representations. This is particularly the case when handling issues in negotiations which are not regarded as being of vital importance for the state in question.

The administrative working procedures of large states are characterized by more formal mechanisms than smaller states. Decisions regarding their negotiating position before a particular negotiation process starts is taken through their formal decision-making system. This is also the case for decisions which are taken during negotiations. They all have to go through the formal hierarchy in the national administration.<sup>256</sup> The German administration, for instance, operates somewhat stiffly within the EU framework. It is, in fact, inflexible in dealing with EU matters. This is partly because the federal system leads to delays in the mandates given to negotiators and also because the German administrative approach is often focused on procedures.<sup>257</sup> The large size of the German administration and its formality restricts its flexibility in handling EU issues. Belgium, meanwhile, which is also a federal state, is able to overcome the complexity of the federal structure in negotiations, by informality and flexibility, as stated above.

The administrations of larger states lack the quick response, made possible by informal decision-making, which the administrations of smaller states can provide. It is, for instance, 'difficult' for the German administration: 'to develop a broad all-encompassing strategy quickly'.<sup>258</sup>

As a German Permanent Representative said: 'formal working procedure in the Permanent Representations of the larger states is the norm. We have more formal arrangements'.<sup>259</sup> There are also, of course, informal consultations within the larger administrations concerning EU matters. They tend however to be about future issues. Decisions about the government's position in negotiations are not taken on an informal basis as happens in the smaller administrations.<sup>260</sup> As a British official stated: 'we spend some of our time talking informally to people in London about issues which are coming up, future issues'.<sup>261</sup>

#### *The Instructions of Governments and Guidelines to Negotiators in EU Institutions: Negotiators Manoeuvrability*

The general working procedure for the Permanent Representatives in negotiations is to state their government's policy-position and to report to the ministries and/or other coordination bodies back home the views of other member states and the Commission. As an official in the European Commission stated: 'when we (officials in the Commission) have raised a kind of agreement they will have to go back to their governments and come back to us'.<sup>262</sup> Official instructions to and guidelines for the Permanent Representatives and other national officials taking part in negotiations varies, however, according to the importance of the issue concerned and the size of state's administration.<sup>263</sup>

If a smaller state regards an issue as not being of vital importance, it will give its officials some room for manoeuvre. As a Portuguese Permanent Representative stated: 'our (smaller states) instructions are not as clear cut as the larger states'.<sup>264</sup> Belgian negotiators claim, for instance, that they lack clear instructions. They do not have the initiative as they are just supposed to wait for the ideas of the Commission.<sup>265</sup> In the case of Denmark, the influence of the Danish parliament (Folketing) and the general political system vanishes when political issues of low importance are on the agenda. 'The administrative-corporative network's influence prevails'<sup>266</sup> and officials' scope for manoeuvre increases. This is particularly the case as the number of EU directives have increased.<sup>267</sup> The margin for manoeuvre for Irish Permanent Representatives is also wide. They 'often mould the instructions to the interests of a consensus in COREPER'.<sup>268</sup> This is because there is direct contact between the Permanent Representative, who oversees the particular issues in question, and the main policy-makers in Dublin. Also, Ireland has a limited number of interests in the EU.<sup>269</sup> A survey amongst civil servants dealing with EU

matters and EU negotiators from five smaller states based in their capitals: The Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland and Portugal, found that they regarded their mandate as being reasonably open. The officials of Belgium and The Netherlands are particularly of that opinion as they argue that their instructions give them leeway. Furthermore, officials from The Netherlands, Belgium and from Portugal claim that they take the initiatives themselves even though their higher officials do not suggest that they do so.<sup>270</sup>

On the other hand, Permanent Representatives from the smaller states have strict instructions in negotiations which concern their state's interests. 'On those subjects they will not have very much flexibility because they are politically sensitive at home.'<sup>271</sup> In Ireland, for instance, officials manoeuvrability is wide, as stated above but: 'almost the only exception is agriculture. Instructions here are much more strict and a Brussels-based official deviates from them at his peril'.<sup>272</sup> Irish Permanent Representatives follow very closely their government's instructions in the beef and milk sectors, and in the Regional Policy.<sup>273</sup> Greek officials have little flexibility to move away from their government's position on tobacco, wine, fruit and vegetables.<sup>274</sup> 'Sometimes small member states have much stricter instructions about what they can say yes or no to'.<sup>275</sup> In Greece 'recently tobacco was a very sensitive issue because Greece has a new government and tobacco growers were threatening to demonstrate in the street. So Greece had very strict instructions on what they could accept in the tobacco regime'.<sup>276</sup>

The manoeuvre of Belgian Permanent Representatives dealing with the Regional Policy is a typical example of how Permanent Representatives of smaller states have strict guidelines in policy areas which are important for their state. The Regional Policy has become a more important policy area for Belgium, as more money has been allocated to it at the Union level and the competition between the Flemish and the Walloon regions has intensified. And as the Regional Policy has gained in importance stricter governments guidelines have to be given to officials in negotiations.<sup>277</sup> As a Belgian Permanent Representative stated: 'the Permanent Representatives have nothing to say, we have no influence over the demand itself. We are only the post office for the Flemish and Walloon regions'.<sup>278</sup> This is because of the institutional structure in Belgium and the increased power of the regions. The regions regard the EU Regional Policy as a very important policy area and try to maximize their benefits from it. As a result Permanent Representatives 'just send to the Commission letters from the Regional governments'.<sup>279</sup> They can comment on positions of the regions

but they have to follow their views. However, Belgian officials stated that they have some flexibility in negotiations when the regions want to obtain more assistance from the Regional Funds but were not in danger of losing any money already provided. The officials were, however, reluctant to admit that they had gained this flexibility because: 'we have got some flexibility from the regional governments without a formal yes from everybody'.<sup>280</sup>

This again confirms the informality of the working procedure of small administrations. Officials are granted manoeuvre without formal decisions or procedures when trying to secure more assistance from the Regional Funds. Belgium's regions gave strict guidelines to officials dealing with sensitive issues but as the opportunities increased for more benefits and the possibility of losing decreased officials gained more freedom in negotiations.<sup>281</sup> Belgium Permanent Representatives do, however, exercise more freedom in negotiations concerning the CAP. When issues on the agenda are not regarded as being of much importance for Belgium interests, and are dealt with by the federal government, they have some manoeuvre in negotiations.<sup>282</sup> Where the interests of small states are not affected their officials have greater freedom than officials from the larger states. As a British Permanent Representative pointed out, on products where the smaller states interests are not at stake: 'they (governments of smaller states) may be less concerned'.<sup>283</sup> As a consequence officials gain some flexibility in negotiations.

However, the instructions to negotiators of larger states are always fairly strict. Permanent Representatives have little freedom as they have strict guidelines from their capitals on all occasions. It does not matter whether an issue is regarded as being of importance for domestic groups in a larger state: officials always get clear guidelines regardless. Instructions from Paris, for instance, to negotiators are clear and they have to follow them strictly. Permanent Representatives have little room for manoeuvre.<sup>284</sup> A German Permanent Representative also pointed out: 'we do generally tend to have fairly strict instructions'.<sup>285</sup> The same can be said about instructions from the administration in Rome, however, Italian negotiators find that their mandate is often not clear enough. They argue that this lack of clarity and limited room for manoeuvre results from the large size of their administration. They felt that large states suffer from disadvantages because of their large administrative size.<sup>286</sup>

Large administrations always try carefully to predict how particular negotiations may develop. Capital-based ministries and other co-ordination bodies form a strategies concerning how negotiators should respond to

particular situations or developments in negotiations, which negotiators have to follow.<sup>287</sup> The French EU decision-making is, for instance, highly centralized and Permanent Representatives do not have to participate in the necessary inter-ministerial co-ordination, which EU dossiers require and which is the norm in the small administrations.<sup>288</sup> On the other hand, the Italian administration is likely to suffer from the prevailing domestic political climate. Italian negotiators usually have good support from their ministries but it is sometimes difficult for them 'to place a well coordinated standpoint on the negotiating table in Brussels'.<sup>289</sup> Preparation for negotiations in the Council requires good co-ordination, a number of officials and experts, and the time for officials to carry out research and suggest new ideas. All the five larger states have this capacity, including Italy and Spain. Spain has overcome its administrative weakness in dealing with EU matters, as will be described below, and the good diplomatic tradition in Italy<sup>290</sup> makes it possible for the national administration in Rome to participate efficiently in EU negotiations.

Briefings to Permanent Representatives and officials from the national capitals demonstrate particularly well the informality of small administrations working procedures and the formality of procedures of the larger states. They also show the different scope of manoeuvre which Permanent Representatives are granted from their national administrations. Permanent Representatives from all the larger states confirmed that they had written briefings from ministries in their capitals before meetings. As a British Permanent Representative stated: 'we have a formal briefing from London before all meetings, that is a written briefing, which is declared with finance ministry colleges'.<sup>291</sup> Furthermore: 'one of our counterparts from a small country in the Special Committee of Agriculture said once with me: you are so lucky to have this written briefing which tells you everything you are supposed to say. I have to deal with this by ringing up somebody in the morning of the meeting at home'.<sup>292</sup> Whether this was said to justify the British formal decision-making mechanism as it lacks flexibility or to show that this administrative working procedure is more efficient does not matter. What does matter is that there seems to be a fundamental difference in the smaller and larger states' administrative working procedures. As a French Permanent Representative pointed out: 'I suspect that larger countries have perhaps a more formal mechanism'.<sup>293</sup> As a result, Permanent representatives of smaller states have considerably more scope for manoeuvre than their counterparts from the larger states.

### **The Capacity of Administrations to cope with the Increasing Demands of the EU**

It takes some time for any administration to adapt to EU negotiations after their entry into the EU. Administrative adaptation does, however, put a particular constraint on a small administration. This was the case of all the smaller states, which were included in this research, which have entered the EU: Ireland, Denmark, Portugal and Greece. In all the four states, particularly Ireland, Portugal and Greece, the civil service was not well prepared for the intense EU negotiation process. They have not, however, all faced the same difficulties. Also, the time which it had taken them to adapt to the EU system varied. The Danish administration seems to have been the quickest to adapt to the system, as its organizational structure was already efficient and reliable. There did however take place within the Danish administration, as in the other four states, a battle between ministries about which of them should take over the primary responsibility for EU policy co-ordination and this took up considerable time and effort. Today, things have changed for the better. Three of the states, Denmark, Ireland and Portugal face no administrative problems in dealing with the EU. They have adapted relatively easily to the EU demands. They are aware of the constraints imposed by their resources and their limited personnel due to their small size compared with the larger states. They have overcome these disadvantages by using flexible working methods, informal methods of communication and given greater manoeuvre to their officials.

However, EU membership can require more than an efficient administration, and a small administration may face difficulties in putting forward new ideas: 'Size and limited staffing resources reduced the scope for reflective position papers and the development of a strategic view of the EU'.<sup>294</sup> The Irish administration depends on severely overworked officials in the Permanent Representation, Foreign Ministry and some other ministries. This can have several implications due to the increased agenda of the EU. 'The expansion of the reach of EU policies and the growing complexity of EU regulations may leave Ireland exposed in areas where the system lacks technical depth and expertise'.<sup>295</sup> The question which we now need to answer is whether small administrations have the capacity to cope with the increasing demands of the EU. We also have to analyse how their capacity compares with that of the larger states.

An analysis of the capability of smaller states to cope with the new Regional Policy structure will give us a good understanding of how smaller



states are able to deal with the EU's increasing demands. We will analyse their administrative working procedure within the Regional Policy by focusing on their behaviour within the Partnership Principle which was introduced in the 1988 Regional Policy reforms. The Partnership Principle introduced a decision-making procedure which places a heavy responsibility on member states. It requires national governments to co-operate closely with regional and local authorities. Thus, the Partnership Principle not only requires administrations to examine, analyse and propose efficient measures to reduce regional disparities, it also requires them to work closely and efficiently with the Commission. In the Partnership Principle, each of the member states has to submit to the Commission a Development Plan where it spells out its priorities within the EU Regional Policy. Then the Commission, in consultation with the member state, draws up a Community Support Framework which demonstrates how the assistance through the structural Funds should be allocated within the state for the next five years. Firstly, we will analyse whether the smaller states submitted satisfactory Development Plans and whether they spelt out their priorities in an efficient way. Also, how their Development Plans compare with those of the larger states. Secondly, we will examine what impact the administrative characteristics of the smaller states, discussed above, have on their interactions in dealing with the Development Plans and whether these interactions differed from these of the larger states.

*The quality of the Development Plans* The Development Plans of the smaller states were all well analysed and professional. They spelt out clearly and efficiently their main priorities. The smaller states were capable of fulfilling all the criteria and they did not have to rely on assistance from the Commission, except for Greece.<sup>296</sup> The small size of their administrations did not in any way affect their ability to draw up satisfactory Development Plans. The Irish and the Portuguese Development Plans, for instance, included considerable consultation with local governments which did not reflect the lack of sub-national authorities within them. The Irish government invited seven sub-regional reviews committees to present their opinions on the forthcoming Development Plan. The government then tried to include their views into the Plan if they were not consistent with the national objectives of maximizing sustainable employment and growth.<sup>297</sup> 'There is now a stronger planning focus'.<sup>298</sup> There is also considerable internal specialisation in the Structural Fund coordination unit in the Department of Enterprise and Employment which is responsible for the most complex and technical areas of the EU Regional

Policy. In addition, the political priority which the Irish government gave the EU Regional Policy was simplified by its formation of a joint Committee of Ministers and Secretaries in 1988. The committee met on a weekly basis to prepare the first Irish National Development Plan.<sup>299</sup>

The Development Plans were also a good negotiation base for the smaller states.<sup>300</sup> This is very important as the Development Plans are the basic documents for member states in their negotiations with the Commission. Development Plans have to be very well prepared, justified and professional in order to satisfy the Commission obligations. This is because a member state has to negotiate with the Commission before the Commission, in consultation with the particular member state, draws up the Community Support Framework. If a member state cannot provide a solid Development Plan it cannot expect to have much influence on its Community Support Framework. The Commission is then in an ideal position to demand that the state follows its suggestions. That is exactly what happened with the Greek government.<sup>301</sup>

The Commission has had difficulties in working with the Greek and Portuguese administrations in the area of the Regional Policy. This can to some extent, be explained by their administrative weakness, structure and small staff. However, the main reason was that the Greek and Portuguese administrations were not well prepared for dealing with all the EU demands when they entered the Community in 1981 and 1986. The Portuguese administrative difficulties have now been overcome. The administration was lacking in experience and it was not able to produce and submit the necessary documents and to co-ordinate EU business at home.<sup>302</sup> Today, the administration of Portugal is very active in dealing with EU matters: It prepares its work thoroughly and it knows how to represent Portuguese interests effectively. And civil servants and EU negotiators in Lisbon argue that their ministries and their Permanent Representation work well together in preparing for negotiations in Brussels.<sup>303</sup>

Officials in the Commission dealing with the Development Plans and taking part in negotiations with member states before drawing up the Community Support Frameworks stated that the Development Plans from the smaller states, Denmark, Ireland, Belgium, The Netherlands, Luxembourg and Portugal, were much better prepared compared to these from the larger states, Germany, Britain, France, Italy and Spain. The Development Plans of the smaller states were better for two reasons: firstly, their priorities were described in detail. Secondly, the plans provided a better negotiation base. Britain, for instance, was very reluctant to give information on how it was planning to use the money from the

Funds. The Development Plan for Northern-Ireland did not even have a financial plan. It was not possible to see where the money was supposed to be used.<sup>304</sup> It took the Commission almost four months to obtain the financial plan, only then could negotiations take place. The German Development Plan was also very poor. The German government wanted the Commission to give it its share of the Funds without excessively long negotiations.<sup>305</sup> In contrast, the smaller states, apart from Greece, felt that they had to be professional in order to satisfy the Commission. They thought that they needed to prove their ability to work within the Partnership Principle.

*The reasons for the high quality of the Development Plans of the smaller states* We have to consider, administrative characteristics of member states, to explain that not only were 6 out of 7 smaller states able to draw up fully satisfactory Development Plans, but they were, in fact, able to draw up better plans than the 5 larger states. The main explanation for the quality of Development Plans of the smaller states is that a small size of an administration makes relations easier. Officials dealing with the Regional Policy are fewer, they know each other and their working procedure is characterized by informality. The reduced formality in decision-making and the fewer steps within the administrations' decision-making system, compared with the larger states, contribute towards making the preparations for the Development Plans an easier task. These characteristics of informality and flexibility work against the disadvantages of the smallness of their administrations. This directly affects their preparation for EU business and documents which they have to submit to EU institutions.

Another explanation for the better Plans of the smaller states is that the small size of their national administrations made it less difficult for them to interlink the relevant bodies, required by the Commission. It was easier for them, compared with the larger states, to oversee workshops between regional administrations and authorities, interest groups, ministries and so on, in order to produce the Development Plans. Smaller administrations had less difficulty in co-ordinating all the necessary administrative work. This was, for instance, the case for both Denmark and Belgium. In Denmark, there are a limited number of officials dealing with the EU Regional Policy and it has been relatively easy for them to oversee and organize policy-formation as well as policy implementation.<sup>306</sup> In Belgium, now a federal state, regions have taken over the responsibility of the EU Regional Policy. Even though conflicts over Belgium EU Regional Policy formation have occurred, they have been able to coordinate their different

emphasis. This is not because there is a clear formal coordination structure to solve disputes but, more importantly, conflicts have been solved by informal meetings.<sup>307</sup>

Furthermore, the great emphasis which smaller governments put on the Regional Policy provides an explanation, as Chapter 4 demonstrated. For example, this emphasis in Ireland can be seen by the fact that the Department of Finance is largely responsible for drafting and implementing the Development Plan. The regional review committees are served by the department and it evaluates the operational programmes.<sup>308</sup>

What also makes policy formation and the day to day working procedures within the administration informal and flexible is that there is often no clear-cut divide between policy formation and implementation in the smaller states. It is often the same official who is involved in the state's policy formation, who attends the Working Groups meeting in the Council, advises the minister for the Council of Ministers meetings and subsequently implements the directive. Thus, the consequences of the small size of the administration are clear: the same official is responsible for negotiating a directive in the Council and incorporating that directive into law. It is often only one or two officials who assume primary responsibility for a series of directives. Furthermore, these same officials also deal with the EU policies which involve grants and other payments. Implementation may mean that they make the rules for eligibility within Community guidelines, select which projects go for consideration in the EU, set the criteria and standards needed to qualify for payment and decide who qualifies.<sup>309</sup> The Netherlands administration has, for instance, made particular efforts to involve implementing officials, especially the legal experts of ministries, in the earlier stages of EU decision-making. Officials who were formerly exclusively involved with implementation, now both participate in the preparations for EU negotiations and negotiate on behalf of their country in the Council. These changes have been made to shorten the implementation process.<sup>310</sup> While this has simplified the Dutch EU policy-making and implementation processes, in the larger states, negotiations are exclusively in the hands of policy-experts and implementation is a responsibility of particular officials.<sup>311</sup> These links between policy formation, negotiations in Brussels and implementation simplify the administrative working procedure, making it more adaptable to change and easier for the smaller states to oversee the relations with the EU institutions. Also, smaller administrations seem to be as capable as the large administrations in implementing EU legislation. Implementation problems are not limited to small member states.<sup>312</sup>



**Administrative Constraints: The Special Case of Greece**

The Greek administration was not prepared for joining the EU in 1981. The administration had to undergo a process of adaptation in order to cope with EU demands. This process has however been slow and the administration has not yet attained the same capability as the other member states in dealing with the increasing scope of the EU. The institutional changes in Greece have been slow, complex and demanding. The Commission had reservations about Greece's membership, particularly on economic grounds, however, it has not only been its economic situation which has been of concern within the EU. In fact, Greece has had to adapt to the EU at all levels: political, governmental, administrative and social. Slow administrative adaptation and poor capacity have been as great drawbacks as bad economic performance.<sup>313</sup> Officials in the European Commission and Permanent Representatives sometimes find that Greek negotiators are not very well prepared for participating in negotiations.<sup>314</sup> 'Greece has adapted faster politically than administratively... This is exactly the opposite of the case of Britain, which adapts faster administratively than politically.'<sup>315</sup>

There have, however, been a considerable number of positive developments in Greece's administrative attempts to work within the EU system. These developments have resulted from two interrelated elements. Firstly, the administration has adapted to its increasing workloads by: informal working methods; flexibility in handling EU issues; and it has given its officials considerable scope for manoeuvre in areas which are not regarded as being of vital interest to Greece. This last point is in direct connection with Greece's prioritisation within the EU, as our evidence suggests in the last chapter. These working procedures of informality, flexibility and manoeuvrability are even more evident in the case of Greece than for other countries. This is because the administration has been slow to develop a formal efficient structure for handling EU issues. The only way for Greek Permanent Representatives to deal with EU issues in time has been by informal communications between themselves and officials back home. The Greek Permanent Representation, as other Permanent Representations of small member states, 'plays an important information- and 'intelligence' -gathering role'<sup>316</sup> in the EU. Greek Permanent Representatives have adapted their own strategy for exerting influence on decision-making in Brussels. The Greek EU administrative working procedure is characterized by flexible decision-making when responding to issues which are not regarded as being of importance for domestic interests.

Decisions are often made in informal meetings and informal contacts between officials.<sup>317</sup>

The requirements of the EU Regional Policy provide a good example of how the administration is not capable of implementing EU policies efficiently because of its lack of administrative resources. It also shows us that while its inefficient domestic administration does not cope with the EU Regional Policy, the administration can participate successfully in negotiations at EU level. This paradox can be explained by the high priority which Greek governments put on securing positive deals in EU Regional Policy. The priority of the administration is to obtain influence from the EU Regional Policy and, in order to do so, it has trained experts and gathered enough resources to participate in the EU negotiations. A formal EU policy-making process has been established but, more importantly, the administration uses its flexible and informal characteristics to participate successfully in the negotiations. Negotiators' only objective is to secure a positive deal. They get strict instructions from the government and have to follow them carefully. However, the administration can respond quickly to new developments in the Council in particular because of the small network of officials responsible for Greek EU Regional Policy formation. Their working procedure is characterized by informal contacts and flexible forms of decision-making. On the other hand, the implementation of the Community Support Framework requires efficient formal working procedure in order to fulfil all the requirements of the Commission and the Greek administration can not cope with that. It faces huge administrative problems working within the Partnership Principle. The Greek government and the administration itself realize this and they have accepted a considerable amount of help from the Commission services. The Commission has given the administration technical assistance to help it to put together programmes and define strategies.<sup>318</sup> In the period of the Community Support Framework, 1989-1993, the Greek administration handled its work very badly. The administration was incapable of proper planning and did not manage to deliver what was required of it under the Partnership Principle. The administration has now agreed to receive assistance from the EU Commission by allowing special project managers to oversee some of the projects.<sup>319</sup> But 'There are still administrative problems affecting the capacity for absorbing the funds available to Greece from the EU, and in properly following up the implementation of the EU programmes and the proper channelling of the related funds'.<sup>320</sup> This has caused a major problem for the Greek government since they do not wished to lose the

money which is vital for the local economy. They are in danger of being accused of mismanagement, not only by the EU Commission and other member states, but more importantly by the government opposition parties and interests concerned. Losing out on finance purely because of low administrative capacity damages a government's credibility. This is particularly the case in a small country where additional funds to build up the infrastructure are widely visible.

The second positive administrative development in Greece has been the establishment of a formal administrative structure to cope with EU demands. EU policy co-ordination has become much more efficient by the creation of administrative bodies in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which coordinates EU policy positions between sectional ministries. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has established a special bureau, the Special Legal Service for the European Communities (ENYEK) to handle all EU affairs. ENYEK 'is doing a very good job'<sup>321</sup> because it employs a large number of analysts and experts on EU matters. Their expertise has particularly developed from having had to face and to resolve all the problems connected with running the Council Presidency. It has enhanced the role of ENYEK and maximised its effectiveness. However, lack of formal administrative procedure due to political considerations and personal priorities of officials do limit the use of the officials of ENYEK. They may serve for three or four years in Brussels but are then transferred back to Greece to positions not at all relevant to their knowledge and experience.<sup>322</sup> Also, a newly elected Greek government changed nearly all of its Permanent Representatives in Brussels just days before it took over the Council Presidency, as it felt the need to replace all of its diplomats with members of the new political party in office. Therefore, part of the problem which the administration of Greece faces in the handling of EU issues seems to result from political conflicts due to the special nature of Greek politics.<sup>323</sup> The Greek government has in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as have the other smaller states in various forms, established a small network of core civil servants, ministers and external experts, such as university professors, to co-ordinate EU affairs. However, membership of these groups of experts has varied due to changes in leadership in the ministry and because of political conflicts. They also have the tendency to vanish after a short time for the same reasons. Politics based around personalities, which characterizes Greece politics has lead to other administrative problems which have had a detrimental effect on Greek interests. For instance, the junior minister of Foreign Affairs represents Greece in the Council of General Affairs while for other member states the

minister represents them. This has led to two problems, one internal and another external: the problem of coordination between the minister and the junior minister, and the fact that the junior minister takes decisions with the other foreign ministers in the Council, while at the other international meetings the Greek foreign minister represents the country. This has been detrimental to Greece's interests in the EU, but has persisted because of the strong personality of the junior minister of Foreign Affairs, who held the post for most of the 1980s. Financial resources have also constrained the Greek administration. ENYEK and other bodies dealing with the EU are in financial difficulties and need an increase in order to deal efficiently with all demands.<sup>324</sup> The Greek administration is, however, developing in the same direction as the other small administrations as sectional ministries gain more authority to handle EU issues on their own. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the main coordination body but there is an increasing tendency for sectional ministries to communicate directly with the Permanent Representatives and EU institutions. 'There is a strong tendency for further specialization in the sectional fields of the EC, so that the new officials will need to possess appropriate expertise and be well prepared for the negotiations within the Community context'.<sup>325</sup>

From 1988 to 1989, all the principal ministries established new directions and departments or reshaped existing units in order to deal with the EU's increasing demands. Regulations to carry out the single market and the broader scope of cooperation forced the Greek government to proceed with a major reshaping of its administration. These changes were necessary to make it possible for the administration to deal effectively with the EU's new challenges.<sup>326</sup>

#### **A Week Large Administration: The Case of Spain**

The administration in Spain provides an interesting insight into how a relatively weak administration, compared to other large states, at the time of entering the EU, has adopted some of the smaller administrations' solutions for coping with EU membership. The administration of Spain has a good diplomatic tradition, a long tradition similar to the French administrative style.<sup>327</sup> The Spanish administration has, however, made successful attempts at increasing the informal ways of communication in order to speed up the EU domestic decision-making process and to participate in EU negotiations. More informal contacts between officials have, in fact, made the administration more efficient in coping with EU

demands. This informality has, however, been established without giving room for a more flexible decision-making process within the administration. Also, the informal networks have been created without the negotiators in Brussels being given more scope for manoeuvre in negotiations. There is, therefore, a fundamental difference in the Spanish administrative working procedure and the smaller states' EU administrative working procedures. The Spanish administration has opted for informal working methods between officials without loosening up its formal EU policy-making structure and its instruction to negotiators in Brussels.<sup>328</sup> On the other hand, Permanent Representatives do take an active part in policy formulation due to the administration's informal ways of handling some EU issues. The Spanish government has, for instance, established a special body, the Interministerial Committee for Economic Affairs related to the EU (CIEA-CE), to improve intragovernmental coordination on an informal basis. The functions of CIEA-CE are to establish ways for informal communications between the ministries and the different administrative departments and units. Its objective is to achieve short-term consensus on pending issues.<sup>329</sup> Decisions on the Spanish position are often made in informal meetings of experts from ministries and the Permanent Representatives, either in Madrid or in Brussels. This procedure has not been institutionalized and informal working methods are the norm. In the absence of formal procedures, Permanent Representatives sometimes formulate Spain's position. The Permanent Representation is, however, closely linked to the sectional ministries which restricts its scope for independent action. Furthermore, room for manoeuvre of the Permanent Representatives is limited by the fact that instructions from the central government are channelled through the Secretariat of State for the EU (SECE), which is in charge of the coordination of the Spanish position, in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Furthermore, sectional ministries usually send their own officials to working group meetings in Brussels and take instruction from their own ministries while the Permanent Representation has to follow instructions from the SECE.<sup>330</sup> The autonomy of the Permanent Representatives in handling EU issues in negotiations has, in fact, decreased over the years.<sup>331</sup> The final decision on a particular issue is made by the minister involved and the Permanent Representation is more like 'a kind of mechanism for informal inter-ministerial coordination'.<sup>332</sup> The relationship between the SECE, the CIEA-CE, the ministries and the Permanent Representation is characterized both by formal decision-making procedures as well as informal decision-making mechanisms. By adopting

more informal ways of handling EU issues, the relationship between these institutions has improved in recent years.<sup>333</sup>

### A Flexible Strategic Adaptation

None of the smaller administrations have made any major organizational adjustments to meet the EU demands. They have all adapted to the increasing demands of the EU by ad hoc responses. Even the SEA and the Maastricht Treaty did not in any way result in a centrally directed adjustment. Administrative adjustments were made in an incremental way. Administrative traditions and arrangements which were already in place were used to cope with new challenges. In Ireland and Greece, for instance, EU matters are dealt with in the same manner as purely domestic issues. The Danish administration has gradually adapted to the EU system and the Netherlands has kept the same administrative procedures in dealing with EU matters as it had in the late 1950s.<sup>334</sup> This has given the Permanent Representatives and other officials scope to form their own way of handling EU matters. They are the first to notice the increasing demands of the EU and they have sometimes had to cope with them on their own. Permanent Representatives and civil servants in ministries do not, however, have the autonomy to create new forms of formal procedures to handle EU issues. As a result, they have developed informal working procedures. They have taken up a flexible strategic adaptation in response to the EU decision-making process. Relationships between national civil servants, and between Permanent Representatives and national civil servants are characterized by informality and flexibility in the handling of individual issues in negotiations. Formal procedural channels, of course, exist and are frequently used, particularly when handling sensitive political issues. But the forms of contacts of policy-makers and negotiators are determined by frequent and informal methods of communication. This is a result of the smallness of small bureaucracies as informal contacts and flexible procedures automatically developed within a small administration. However, small administrations have made an attempt to enhance a flexible strategic adaptation to the EU in order to cope with its increasing demands.

Scholars have also suggested that the politics in smaller states are based on more informal channels of communications than in larger states. Decisions in Belgium, for instance, tend to take place outside the existing formal institutions.<sup>335</sup> Political consensus in Belgium is built within networks which operate outside the formal circuits. Formal organizations

exercise their power officially but decisions are made by informal contacts.<sup>336</sup> The only way for a small administration to cope with the complexity of the EU has been to respond to events with a flexible strategy. Daily, national officials have to respond to proposals of the Commission or new developments in working groups. They have to formulate the national position and prepare strategies to get it through the Council. New situations have to be responded to without a delay and new approaches used. To cope with this, civil servants, dealing with EU matters, and Permanent Representatives have been granted considerable manoeuvre to formulate domestic EU policies and to handle negotiations in the Council. This is particularly the case when dealing with issues which are not regarded as being of primary importance for the state in question. When an issue become politically important, negotiators receive instructions instead of guidelines. There also prevails in small states, autonomy of the ministers<sup>337</sup> which brings policy-makers in the ministry concerned near to Permanent Representatives and other negotiators. Negotiators are in direct informal and formal contact with policy-makers which can grant them some scope for manoeuvre.

### Conclusion

Our evidence suggests that the size of a state's administration plays an important part in a state's behaviour in the decision-making process of the EU. The advantages and disadvantages of small administrations have to be taken into consideration when explaining the behaviour of small states in the EU context. A small administration is able to cope with the EU demands because of its special characteristics and because it makes a particular effort to enhance these characteristics. The administrative working procedures of smaller states are characterized by informal communications, flexible decision-making, greater manoeuvrability of officials, and by guidelines rather than instructions to negotiators when not dealing with important issues. These features make it possible for a small administration to participate successfully in the EU decision-making system. The Greek administration is the only exception as it does not have the capacity to fulfil all its functions. But its weakness has more to do with its history and tradition than its small size. The administration is characterized by the same informality, flexibility and manoeuvrability as the other small administrations, and it can take an efficient part in negotiation at the Council level. Spain, due to its weak administrative

structure at the time of entry compared to other larger states, has adopted some of the working procedures of the small administrations. However, Spain is a long way from having the same amount of decision-making flexibility and freedom for its negotiators as is the norm for smaller states.

The public policy literature distinguishes between active and reactive administrations<sup>338</sup> and our evidence suggest that the small administrations use all their capacity to deliver positive deals in beneficiary policy-sectors while they systematically limit their role in others. The public policy literature also distinguishes between formal and informal administrative working procedures<sup>339</sup> and our evidence clearly demonstrates that small administrations' informal methods in handling EU matters are the norm rather than the exception, as opposed to large administrations. Furthermore, the public policy literature distinguishes between vertical and horizontal approaches.<sup>340</sup> The Permanent Representations are formally auxiliary branches of the national administrations in the capitals of member states.<sup>341</sup> However, the smaller states Permanent Representations operate using a horizontal approach within their national administrations. They operate at all levels within the administration. Permanent Representatives are, for instance, in direct contact with the main policy-makers situated at the highest level of policy-making in the administration. This horizontal nature of their working procedures is a direct consequence of the administrations' small size.

Looking back at the approach of Katzenstein regarding small states, our findings, in the previous chapters, concerning the fewer economic interests of smaller states in the EU compared with the larger states, coincide with his findings on the narrower economic interests of small Western-European states. Katzenstein does, however, fail to take into account the administrative size and characteristics in explaining their behaviour. Our evidence in this chapter suggests that the behaviour of smaller states in the decision-making system of the EU, in the areas of CAP and the Regional Policy, are influenced by their administrative small size. A small administration is characterized by particular features, discussed above, such as: informality; flexible decision-making; a greater scope for manoeuvre for officials; and by guidelines to negotiators instead of instructions. These features are key factors in explaining how a small administration copes with EU demands. Furthermore, they provide explanations for a state's approach within the EU decision-making system. Katzenstein's failure to take into account what impact a small administration has on a small state's behaviour internationally means his approach only explains half of the picture regarding their behaviour.

Katzenstein's examination of the relationship between the political elite, interest groups and administrations does not overcome this problem. This is because he does not analyse directly, or in detail, the advantages and disadvantages of small administrations. He is, however, right when stating that institutions in smaller states are selective in problem definition and that interorganizational relations are very personal. He also comes to the conclusion that organizations in smaller states have broader functions because they deal with a greater variety of issues compared with organizations in larger states. Furthermore, he is correct when stating that decisions in smaller states are made by few decision-makers and there is a fluidity in their relationships while at the same time there being oligarchic tendencies. He also claims that the centralization of domestic structures in smaller states is a result of their small size. However, Katzenstein comes to these conclusions by providing an external explanation: a dependency on the world market. Also, their narrower economic interests is at the forefront of his explanation for the smaller states' distinguishing policy-process. He does not, as stated above, analyse directly the small size of administrations and their resulting characteristics and therefore what impact they have on their international behaviour. Our evidence shows that this is an important variable missing in his analysis. It is mentioned, but not dealt with, properly and, therefore, he leaves out an important link which explains the behaviour of small states. He is, in fact, partly right and partly wrong. Smaller states' behaviour needs a much broader explanation than the number of their economic interests. Their behaviour is characterised by their small administrations, including lack of access to experts in some policy sectors, and lack of other resources. We would have reached the wrong conclusion if we had not concentrated on the administrations of states.

## Notes

- <sup>184</sup>Katzenstein P. (1985), *op. cit.*, p. 89-90.  
<sup>185</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 134.  
<sup>186</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 133.  
<sup>187</sup>We analyse negotiation tactics of member states in the Council of Ministers in Chapter 7.  
<sup>188</sup>We examine member states' relations with the European Commission in Chapter 6.  
<sup>189</sup>We focus on the participation of member states in the European Council in Chapter 7.  
<sup>190</sup>Vincent Wright mentions several points which complicate the co-ordination of national administrations in Wright V. (1996), 'The national co-ordination of European policy-making: Negotiation the quagmire' in Richardson J. (ed.), *European Union, Power and Policy-Making* (London and New York: Routledge).

- <sup>191</sup>Mazey S. and Richardson J. (1993) (eds), *Lobbying in the European Community* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 22-23, as quoted by Wright V. (1996), *op. cit.*, p. 151.  
<sup>192</sup>Wright V. (1996), *op. cit.*, p. 151-152.  
<sup>193</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 153.  
<sup>194</sup>De Zwaan J.W. (1995), *The Permanent Representatives Committee: Its Role in European Union Decision-Making* (T.M.C. Asser Institute - The Hague: Elsevier), p. 33.  
<sup>195</sup>Stedemont H. and Ziller J. (1988), (eds), 'Making European Politics Works', Vol. 1 *Comparative Syntheses* (London: European Institute of Public Administration, London: Segal), p. 199, see the case of Britain for the 1986 subsidies to shipbuilding Directive, as quoted by Wright V. (1996), *op. cit.*, p. 149.  
<sup>196</sup>De Zwaan J.W. (1985), *op. cit.*, p. 33.  
<sup>197</sup>Wright V. (1996), *op. cit.*, p. 155.  
<sup>198</sup>Hoscheit J.M. (1992), 'Administrative adaptation in the context of regional integration: Luxembourg and the European Community', in Baker P. (ed.), *Public administration in small and island states* (United States: Kumarian Press), p. 268-269. Hoscheit argues that administrative organizations and procedures are based on three different factors: 1. the political culture, in its narrowest sense, according to the works of Almond, Pye and Verba, in the early 1950s, which defined the values and attitudes of the social body in relation to the political system. 2. The internal attitudes and values of the administration which define the identity, interaction and informal working methods and the type of relations maintained with other bodies. 3. The policy style which characterizes the decision-making and implementation systems of public policies in each state.  
<sup>199</sup>Wright V. (1996), *op. cit.*, p. 156.  
<sup>200</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 154-155.  
<sup>201</sup>De Zwaan J. W. (1985), *op. cit.*, p. 25. This is a very important role of the Permanent Representations, particularly for Permanent Representations of the smaller states. We will get back to these points below.  
<sup>202</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 159-160.  
<sup>203</sup>De Zwaan J. W. (1985), *op. cit.*, p. 25. This is a very important role of the Permanent Representations, particularly for Permanent Representations of the smaller states. We will get back to these points below.  
<sup>204</sup>Bart K. and Beyers J. (1998), 'Belgium: The Dilemma between Cohesion and Autonomy' in Hanf K. and Soetendorp B. (eds), *Adapting to European Integration. Small States and the European Union* (London and New York: Longman), p. 19.  
<sup>205</sup>Hoscheit J.M. (1992), *op. cit.*, p. 267.  
<sup>206</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 267.  
<sup>207</sup>Interviews with Permanent Representatives from smaller and larger states and officials in the European Commission.  
<sup>208</sup>Meerts P. (1995), 'Negotiating in the European Union' in *Discussion Papers Diplomacy* (University of Leicester, Department of Politics: Centre for the Study of Diplomacy), p. 5. The Netherlands Institute of International Relations (Clingendael) has undertaken a research to gain a better insight into the profile of the diplomatic negotiator in the EU. Meerts analyses actions of negotiators from five smaller states: The Netherlands, Belgium, Portugal, Denmark and Ireland. Surveys were sent out to the European Departments of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of these member states and the Permanent Representation of the Netherlands in Brussels.  
<sup>209</sup>Bart K. and Beyers J. (1998), *op. cit.*, p. 31. We will return to this in our analysis of negotiation approaches of smaller states in the Council in Chapter 7.

- <sup>210</sup> Hayes-Renshaw F., Lequesne C. and Mayor-Lopez P. (1989), 'The Permanent Representations of the Member States to the European Communities' in *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 28, No. 2, p. 122 and 135.
- <sup>211</sup> An interview with a British Permanent Representative.
- <sup>212</sup> Interviews with Permanent Representatives from smaller states.
- <sup>213</sup> Bart K. and Beyers J. (1998), *op. cit.*, p. 24-25.
- <sup>214</sup> Laffan B. and Tannam E. (1998), 'Ireland: The Rewards of Pragmatism', in Hanf K. and Soetendorp B. (eds), *Adapting to European Integration: Small States and the European Union* (London and New York: Longman), p. 75.
- <sup>215</sup> Interviews with officials in the Permanent Representations of the member states.
- <sup>216</sup> Laffan B. and Tannam E. (1998), *op. cit.*, p. 75.
- <sup>217</sup> Interviews with Permanent Representatives.
- <sup>218</sup> We will analyse in detail negotiation tactics of member states in Chapter 7.
- <sup>219</sup> Von Dosemrode S.Z. (1998), 'Denmark: The Testing of a Hesitant Membership', in Hanf K. and Soetendorp B. (eds), *Adapting to European Integration: Small States and the European Union* (London and New York: Longman), p. 56.
- <sup>220</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 56.
- <sup>221</sup> Laffan B. and Tannam E. (1998), *op. cit.*, p. 79.
- <sup>222</sup> Informality and flexibility of administrations of member states is examined in the section below.
- <sup>223</sup> Laffan B. and Tannam E. (1998), *op. cit.*, p. 79.
- <sup>224</sup> Soetendorp B. and Kenneth H. (1998), 'The Netherlands: Growing Doubts of a Loyal Member', in Hanf K. and Soetendorp B. (eds), *Adapting to European Integration: Small States and the European Union* (London and New York: Longman), p. 37.
- <sup>225</sup> An interview with an official in the DG VI for Agriculture in the Commission.
- <sup>226</sup> Bart K. and Beyers J. (1998), *op. cit.*, p. 24-25.
- <sup>227</sup> Interviews with officials from Permanent Representations of smaller states.
- <sup>228</sup> Meerts P. (1995), *op. cit.*, p. 8-10.
- <sup>229</sup> An interview with an official in the DG VI for Regional Policy in the Commission.
- <sup>230</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>231</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>232</sup> Interviews with officials in Permanent Representations of member states.
- <sup>233</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>234</sup> Interviews with officials from Permanent Representations of the smaller states.
- <sup>235</sup> Sigfusson T. (1996), *The Ministate in Turbulence* (Iceland).
- <sup>236</sup> Bart K. and Beyers J. (1998), *op. cit.*, p. 25.
- <sup>237</sup> This was, for instance, the case of the Voting Directive on unrestricted voting rights for European citizens: 'The formal meetings were rather limited while the informal network was very dense. Furthermore, this dense informal network was highly political in character. Contacts took place at the level of cabinets. Therefore the Voting Directive is a good example of informal decision-making working towards getting a consensus on highly politicized issues in a relatively short period of time'. In Bart K. and Beyers J. (1998), *op. cit.*, p. 25.
- <sup>238</sup> Beyers J. (1994), 'De Structuur van Besluitvorming in de Raad van Ministers van de Europese Unie', in *Res Publica*, Vol. 3-4, p. 381-98 as quoted by Bart K. and Beyers J. (1998), *op. cit.*, p. 28. Beyers shows the Belgian co-ordination of the Waste Directive. This has also been confirmed by previous research.
- <sup>239</sup> Bart K. and Beyers J. (1998), *op. cit.*, p. 28.

- <sup>240</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 27.
- <sup>241</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 27.
- <sup>242</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 28.
- <sup>243</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 32.
- <sup>244</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 33.
- <sup>245</sup> Rasmussen H. (1985), Internationale organisationer (Copenhagen: Gads Forlag) as quoted by Von Dosemrode S.Z. (1998), *op. cit.*, p. 52.
- <sup>246</sup> Nielsen in Gammeltoft-Hansen H., Gornard B. and Philip A. (eds), (1982), *Danish Law* (Copenhagen: G.E.C. Gad), as quoted by Von Dosemrode S.Z., *op. cit.*, p. 52.
- <sup>247</sup> Von Dosemrode S.Z., *op. cit.*, p. 54.
- <sup>248</sup> Farbak L. (1996), *The Social Dimension and The Danish EU Decision-Making Process*, a paper presented at a seminar organized by Copenhagen Research Project on European Integration (CORE) at the University of Copenhagen in Denmark, May 1998.
- <sup>249</sup> Laffan B. and Tannam E. (1998), *op. cit.*, p. 81.
- <sup>250</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 78-81.
- <sup>251</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 78.
- <sup>252</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 78.
- <sup>253</sup> Soetendorp B. and Kenneth H. (1998), *op. cit.*, p. 36-51.
- <sup>254</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 50.
- <sup>255</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 36-51.
- <sup>256</sup> Interviews with Permanent Representatives from the larger states.
- <sup>257</sup> Meerts P. (1995), *op. cit.*, p. 5.
- <sup>258</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 5.
- <sup>259</sup> An interview with a German Permanent Representative.
- <sup>260</sup> Interviews with Permanent Representatives from the larger states.
- <sup>261</sup> An interview with a British Permanent Representative.
- <sup>262</sup> An interview with an official in the European Commission.
- <sup>263</sup> Interviews with Permanent Representatives.
- <sup>264</sup> An interview with a Portuguese Permanent Representative. This is confirmed by the survey carried out by The Netherlands Institute of International Relations (Clingendael), see Meerts P. (1995), *op. cit.*, p. 12.
- <sup>265</sup> Bart K. and Beyers J. (1998), *op. cit.*, p. 31. This is also confirmed by the survey carried out by The Netherlands Institute of International Relations (Clingendael). See Meerts P. (1995), *op. cit.*, p. 12.
- <sup>266</sup> Von Dosemrode S.Z. (1998), *op. cit.*, p. 60.
- <sup>267</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 66.
- <sup>268</sup> Hayes-Renshaw F., Lequesne C. and Mayor-Lopez P. (1989), *op. cit.*, p. 131.
- <sup>269</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 131.
- <sup>270</sup> Meerts P. (1995), *op. cit.*, p. 12.
- <sup>271</sup> An interview with an official in the European Commission.
- <sup>272</sup> Hayes-Renshaw F., Lequesne C. and Mayor-Lopez P. (1989), *op. cit.*, p. 131.
- <sup>273</sup> An interview with an Irish Permanent Representative.
- <sup>274</sup> An interview with a Greek Permanent Representative.
- <sup>275</sup> An interview with an official in the European Commission.
- <sup>276</sup> An interview with an official in the European Commission.
- <sup>277</sup> Interviews with Belgian Permanent Representatives.
- <sup>278</sup> An interview with a Belgian Permanent Representative.
- <sup>279</sup> An interview with a Belgian Permanent Representative.



- <sup>280</sup> An interview with a Belgian Permanent Representative.
- <sup>281</sup> We will examine in detail Belgium's attempt to get its region, Hainaut, accepted as an Objective 1 region in Chapter 6.
- <sup>282</sup> Interviews with Belgian Permanent Representatives and a Belgian civil servant in the Ministry of Agriculture.
- <sup>283</sup> An interview with a British Permanent Representative.
- <sup>284</sup> Hayes-Renshaw F., Lequesne C. and Mayor-Lopez P. (1989), *op.cit.*, p. 135
- <sup>285</sup> An interview with a German Permanent Representative.
- <sup>286</sup> Meerts P. (1995), *op.cit.*, p. 10. These findings are from interviews with negotiators from Rome dealing with EU matters.
- <sup>287</sup> This will be followed up in Chapter 7.
- <sup>288</sup> Hayes-Renshaw F., Lequesne C. and Mayor-Lopez P. (1989), *op.cit.*, p. 135.
- <sup>289</sup> Meerts P. (1995), *op.cit.*, p. 5.
- <sup>290</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 5.
- <sup>291</sup> An interview with a British Permanent Representative dealing with agriculture.
- <sup>292</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>293</sup> An interview with a French Permanent Representative.
- <sup>294</sup> Laftan B. and Tannam E. (1998), *op.cit.*, p. 81.
- <sup>295</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 82.
- <sup>296</sup> We will analyse the administrative capacity of Greece in a separate section, as this administration has difficulties in coping with the EU demands.
- <sup>297</sup> Stationery Office Dublin (1993), *National Development Plan (NDP) 1994-99*, (Dublin: Stationery Office).
- <sup>298</sup> Laftan B. and Tannam E. (1998), *op.cit.*, p. 82.
- <sup>299</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 77.
- <sup>300</sup> Interviews with officials in the European Commission.
- <sup>301</sup> An analysis of the Greek administration is provided below.
- <sup>302</sup> Interviews with officials in the European Commission and Permanent Representatives.
- <sup>303</sup> Meerts P. (1995), *op.cit.*, p. 6 and 12.
- <sup>304</sup> An interview with an official in the European Commission.
- <sup>305</sup> An interview with an official in the European Commission.
- <sup>306</sup> An interview with a Danish Permanent Representative.
- <sup>307</sup> Interviews with Belgian Permanent Representatives.
- <sup>308</sup> Laftan B. and Tannam E. (1998), *op.cit.*, p. 81.
- <sup>309</sup> Interviews with officials in the European Commission and interviews with Permanent Representatives from the smaller states.
- <sup>310</sup> Soetendorp B. and Kenneth H. (1998), *op.cit.*, p. 50.
- <sup>311</sup> Interviews with Permanent Representatives from the larger states.
- <sup>312</sup> Soetendorp B. and Hanf K. (1998), *op.cit.*, p. 191.
- <sup>313</sup> Christakis M. (1998), 'Greece: Competing with Regional Priorities' in Hanf K. and Soetendorp B. (eds), *Adapting to European Integration: Small States and the European Union* (London and New York: Longman), p. 87.
- <sup>314</sup> Interviews with officials in the European Commission and Permanent Representatives from member states. Also, see Meerts P. (1995), *op.cit.*, p. 6.
- <sup>315</sup> Christakis M. (1998), *op.cit.*, p. 98-99. By political adaptation Christakis means that Greek governments try to combine interests of Greece and EU interests. He argues that there is a major attempt to combine Greek interests and EU interests in all policy sectors

- except for one, the foreign policy sector. Greek interests are however always put first and then they are followed by EU interests.
- <sup>316</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 93.
- <sup>317</sup> Interviews with Greek Permanent Representatives and officials in the European Commission.
- <sup>318</sup> Interviews with officials in the European Commission and in the Greek Permanent Representatives.
- <sup>319</sup> Markopoulitis G. (1995), a speech given at a conference on Greece in the EU at the London School of Economic and Political Science by Dr. Georgios Markopoulitis who works in the EU Commission dealing with the Regional Policy.
- <sup>320</sup> Christakis M. (1998), *op.cit.*, p. 95.
- <sup>321</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 95.
- <sup>322</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 95.
- <sup>323</sup> Meerts P. (1995), *op.cit.*, p. 6.
- <sup>324</sup> Christakis M. (1998), *op.cit.*, p. 91-95.
- <sup>325</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 92.
- <sup>326</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 90.
- <sup>327</sup> Meerts P. (1995), *op.cit.*, p. 5.
- <sup>328</sup> We will come back to this point when analysing the negotiation approach of Spain in the Council. The negotiation approach of Spain clearly shows that it behaves as the other four larger states and that Spain can be distinguished from the seven smaller states.
- <sup>329</sup> Morata F. (1998), 'Spain: Modernization through Integration', in Hanf K. and Soetendorp B. (eds), *Adapting to European Integration: Small States and the European Union* (London and New York: Longman), p. 103.
- <sup>330</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 103.
- <sup>331</sup> Hayes-Renshaw F., Lequesne C. and Mayor-Lopez P. (1989), *op.cit.*, p. 123.
- <sup>332</sup> Morata F. (1998), *op.cit.*, p. 103.
- <sup>333</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 103.
- <sup>334</sup> Soetendorp B. and Hanf K. (eds) (1998), *op.cit.*, p. 186.
- <sup>335</sup> De Wachter W. (1992) *Besluitvorming in Politiek België* (Louvain: Acco) and Denis C. (1992) *De Interministerie Economische Commissie: Beperkte herziening of grootscheepse hervorming?*, Kwartaloverzicht van de Economie, vol. 3, p. 78-93 as quoted by Bart K. and Beyers J. (1998), *op.cit.*, p. 15.
- <sup>336</sup> Bart K. and Beyers J. (1998), *op.cit.*, p. 16.
- <sup>337</sup> 'Ministries' autonomy prevails in all the smaller states analysed in the book by Hanf K. and Soetendorp B. (1998), (eds), *op.cit.*
- <sup>338</sup> Wright V. (1996), *op.cit.*, p. 148.
- <sup>339</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 148.
- <sup>340</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 148.
- <sup>341</sup> Hayes-Renshaw F., Lequesne C. and Mayor-Lopez P. (1989), *op.cit.*, p. 128.